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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER FEDERAL
POLLUTION LAWS
David P. Currie*
In an effort to remedy "uncertainties" in their predecessor statutes,
which were silent on the subject,1 both the Clean Air Act2 (CAA) and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act3 (FWPCA) were amended in the early
1970's to include explicit provisions for judicial review. Experience has
shown, however, that uncertainties persist; the time has come for legislative
re-examination.
Both statutes are administered by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Both are extraordinarily complicated. Both pre-
serve provisions for federal research and training programs,4 for financial
assistance to state control programs,5 and for the encouragement of uni-
form state laws and interstate control agencies.6 The CAA authorizes the
adoption of federal regulations prescribing standards of performance for
new stationary sources of pollution endangering public health 7 emission
standards for sources of "hazardous" pollutants,8 emission standards for
vehicles9 and for aircraft, 10 and standards for the composition of fuels.1'
Upon federal adoption of ambient air quality standards12 for various pol-
lutants, the states are to develop, subject to federal review, plans to imple-
ment those standards through emission limitations and other regulatory
measures.' 3 While the states are expected to bear a substantial part of the
burden of enforcing implementation plans, their provisions as well as
federally adopted standards are also enforceable by the Federal EPA. 14
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Chairman, Illinois Pollution Control Board,
1970-72.
1. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1970).
2. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 101-403, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1970)) [hereinafter cited as CAA].
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 22
101-516, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as
FWPCA].
4. FWPCA § 104, 33 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 1857b
(1970).
5. FWPCA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 1957c
(1970).
6. FWPCA § 103, 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1857a
(1970).
7. CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970).
8. Id. § 112,42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7.
9. Id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1.
10. Id. § 231, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-9.
11. Id. § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c.
12. See id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4.
13. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5.
14. Id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8.
1221
HeinOnline  -- 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1221 1976-1977
62 IOWA LAW REVIEW 1221 [1977]
The Act also retains, in vestigial form, a cumbersome conference proce-
dure for abatement of pollution.15
The heart of the FWPCA is a permit system, administration of which
may be delegated to the states under specified conditions.' 6 Permits are to
be issued if the discharger complies with a complex array of standards,
including federal effluent standards for "toxic" pollutants17 and standards
of performance for new sources.18 In addition, private point sources must
employ by July 1, 1977, the "best practicable control technology currently
available" and by July I, 1983, the "best available technology economically
achievable"; publicly owned treatment works, by the same dates, are re-
quired to implement "secondary treatment," and the "best practicable
waste treatment technology," respectively.' 9 Permittees must also comply
with applicable state requirements and with any limitation required to
implement water quality standards2 0 which are adopted by states subject to
federal review.21 More stringent federal standards are to be adopted,
subject to some economic constraint, when necessary to protect legitimate
water uses.22 Federal standards are also to be adopted to govern wastes
from vessels,23 and there are special provisions for the discharge of oil or
other hazardous substances24 and for the deposit of dredgings25 and sew-
age sludge.2 6 Federal enforcement of these standards and provisions is
authorized.2 7 Grants Are provided for the construction of publicly owned
treatment facilities. 28
Section 509(b) of the FWPCA provides for judicial review of certain
federal standards and limitations regulating the discharges of pollutants, of
federal action in passing upon state permit programs, and of federal
issuance or denial of permits, upon the filing of an application by "any
interested person" in the "Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for
the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or transacts such
business" 29 within ninety days after the challenged action is taken.30 Section
15. See id. § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d.
16. FWPCA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. V 1975).
17. Id. § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317.
18. Id. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
19. Id. § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 303, 33 U.S.C..§ 1313.
22. Id. § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312.
23. Id. § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1322.
24. Id. § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
25. Id. § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
26. Id. § 405, 33 U.S.C. § 1345.
27. Id. § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
28. Id. §§ 201-207, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1237.
29. Since 1948 the correct title has been "United States Court of Appeals," each with
jurisdiction over a "circuit" containing several "districts." See 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1970).
30. FWPCA § 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. V 1975) provides in substantial part:
(b)(1) Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any standard of
performance under section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any determination
pursuant to section 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent
standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, (D)
1222
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307(b) of the CAA, allowing only thirty days and not specifying by whom
review may be sought, separates most of those actions reviewable in the
courts of appeals into two classes:3' national ambient air quality standards,
federal emission standards, and federal fuel standards are to be reviewed
"only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia";
the EPA Administrator's "action in approving or promulgating any im-
plementation plan" is reviewable "only in the United States Court of Appe-
als for the appropriate circuit. '32 Under both statutes, "action of the Ad-
in making any determination as to a State permit program submitted under section
1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or
other limitation under section 1311, 1312, or 1316 of this title, and (F) in issuing or
denying any permit under section1342 of this title, may be had by any interested
person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial
district in which such person resides or transacts such business upon application by
such person. Any such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of
such determination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such date
only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth
day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be subject to judicial
review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.
(c) In any judicial proceeding brought under subsection (b) of this section in
which review is sought of a determination under this chapter required to be made
on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, if any party applies to the
court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the
court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the
Administrator, the court may order such additional evidence (and evidence in
rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Administrator, in such manner and upon
such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. The Administrator may
modify his findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional
evidence so taken and he shall file such modified or new findings, and his recom-
mendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of his original determina-
tion, with the return of such additional evidence.
31. Section 110(f) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(2)(B) (1970), provides for review of
determinations respecting state applications for postponement of implementation plan re-
quirements in "the United States court of appeals for the circuit which includes such State
upon the filing in such court within 30 days from the date of such decision of a petition by any
interested person."
Section 206(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-5(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1970), authorizes
review of determinations respecting suspension or revocation of motor vehicle compliance
certificates upon petition by "the manufacturer" in "the United States court of appeals for the
circuit wherein such manufacturer resides or has his principal place of business" in "any case
of actual controversy as to the validity of [such] determination."
32. CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(b)(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard
under section 1857c-7 of this title, any standard of performance under section
1857c-6 of this title, any standard under section 1857f-I of this tile (other than a
standard required to be prescribed under section 1857f-l(b)(1) of this title), any
determination under section 1857f-l(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition
under section 1857f-6c of this title, or any standard under section 1857f-9 of this
title may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or section
1857c-6(d) of this tile, or his action under section 1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of
this title or under regulations thereunder, may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within
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ministrator with respect to which review could have been obtained" under
the foregoing provisions "shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for enforcement."33 In addition, both statutes contain
citizen-suit provisions authorizing "any person"3 4 or any person "having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected 35 to file an action in federal
district court against the Administrator for "failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this [Act] which is not discretionary." 36
30 days from the date of such promulgation, approval, or action, or after such date
if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for enforcement.
(c) In any judicial proceeding in which review is sought of a determination
under this chapter required to be made on the record after notice and opportunity
for hearing, if any party applies to the court for leave to adduce such additional
evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such
evidence in the proceeding before the Administrator, the court may order such
additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the
Administrator, in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court
may deem proper. The Administrator may modify his findings as to the facts, or
make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken and he shall file
such modified or new findings, and his recommendation, if any, for the modifica-
tion or setting aside of his original determination, with return of such additional
evidence.
33. FWPCA § 509(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 307(b)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970). See notes 29, 30 supra.
34. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
35. FWPCA § 505(a), (g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (Supp. V 1975).
36. FWPCA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2(a) (1970). In both Acts the citizen-suit provisions read in substantial part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) [of this section], any [person (title 33)
or citizen (title 42)] may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Ad-
ministrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discre-
tionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy or the citizenship of the parties. .-. to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty ....
(b) No action may be commenced-
(2) under subsection (a)(2) [of this section] prior to 60 days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the
case of an action under this section respecting a violation of [§ 1857c-7(c)(1)(B) of
title 42, or §§ 1316 and 1317(a) of title 33, or an order issued by the Administrator
pursuant to § 1857c-8(a) of title 42]. Notice under this subsection shall be given in
such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
(d) The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to [subsection (a)
of] this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. The court may,
if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought, require the filing of a
bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any [emission or effluent]
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or
a State agency),
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Sorting out who may take which cases to what courts and when they
may do so under these provisions has already yielded a bumper crop of
litigation. This Article undertakes to analyze and criticize the judicial
review provisions under the federal pollution laws and the cases interpret-
ing them and to suggest legislative and judicial improvements.3 7
I. ACTIONS SUBJECT TO REVIEW
Not every action of the Administrator under the CAA and the FWPCA
is expressly made reviewable. For example, nothing is said about judicial
review of regulations respecting the discharge of sewage from vessels38 or
the discharge of oil and other hazardous materials;3 9 of the decision to
allow additional time to control the emission of "hazardous" air pollut-
ants; 40 or of the various determinations to be made with respect to grants
for sewage treatment plant construction.41 In some such cases a citizen suit
will lie under the quasi-mandamus provisions to compel performance of a
non-discretionary duty, as when the Administrator was ordered to allot the
sums appropriated for construction grants under the FWPCA.42 As I shall
attempt to show below,43 however, these provisions cannot be stretched
into a general mandate for reviewing all actions on the merits. In cases
beyond their scope one must ask whether judicial review can be had on
some basis outside the pollution statutes themselves.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that, "ex-
cept to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law,"44 "final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial
review." 45 These provisions, the Supreme Court has said, embody a "basic
presumption of judicial review": "only upon a showing of 'clear and con-
vincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict
access to judicial review. ' 46 Therefore the mere omission of an action of the
Administrator from the explicit review provisions of the CAA and the
FWPCA does not demonstrate that such action cannot be reviewed; 47 one
must ask in each instance whether the omission reflects a congressional
37. This Article was originally prepared as a report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States. The Conference acted on most of the recommendations of that report in
December 1976. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976). The Article reflects the action of the
Conference and other recent developments.
38. FWPCA § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. V 1975).
39. Id. § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
40. CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1970).
41. FWPCA § 204, 33 U.S.C. § 1284 (Supp. V 1975).
42. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975), in which jurisdiction was not
discussed.
43. See text accompanying notes 207-11 infra.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
45. Id. § 704.
46. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 141 (1967) (citation omitted).
47. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner held that the inclusion of specific provisions for review
of certain actions need not imply that the failure to provide for review of others was an
attempt to preclude review.
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desire to preclude review or to commit the question to agency discretion,
and, if not, whether independent jurisdictional grounds exist outside the
pollution statutes to support a judicial challenge.
Finding independent jurisdictional grounds is easy. A claim that the
Administrator has erred in carrying out duties imposed by federal statute is
a claim arising under federal law, 48 and the $10,000 jurisdictional
minimum for such cases was recently made inapplicable to any action
"against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee
thereof in his official capacity. '49 The same act amended the APA to do
away with any lingering possibility that actions for nonmonetary relief
against federal officers might be barred by sovereign immunity or for
failure to join the United States as a party.-" The Declaratory Judgment
Act provides a remedy.5' Thus, assuming a ripe controversy and a plaintiff
with standing, the only question is whether Congress meant to preclude
review.
The quasi-mandamus provisions expressly declare that they do not
preclude judicial review of actions they do not cover: "Nothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any person. . . may have under any
statute or common law. . . to seek any other relief . -5 The provisions
for review by federal courts of appeals are silent on this question, but the
House Committee was explicit in respect to section 509 of the FWPCA:
"The inclusion of section 509 is not intended to exclude judicial review
under other provisions of the legislation that are [sic] otherwise permitted
by law."53 Legislative history is not so clear with respect to section 307 of the
CAA, but again it gives no evidence of a purpose to limit review. The
Senate Report states that the purpose of section 307 was the removal of
"uncertainty" as to the availability of judicial review and that the "preclud-
ing of review does not appear to be warranted or desirable"; it says nothing
about actions omitted from section 307.14 In the case of neither statute,
therefore, can there be a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of an
intention to restrict nonstatutory review generally. It remains possible,
however, that review of particular actions may be found precluded or
otherwise inappropriate.
A. State Action on Water Permits
Section 402 of the FWPCA55 authorizes the Administrator, or upon his
certification a state, to issue permits allowing the discharge of pollutants.
48. The claim therefore falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), the "federal question"
provision, Id. § 1331(a).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 6553 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)).
50. Id. § 1, at 6577 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
52. CAA § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970); FWPCA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(Supp. V 1975).
53. H.R. REP. No.911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972).
54. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1970).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975).
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Section 509(b)56 provides for review of the Administrator's action under
section 402 by federal courts of appeals; it is silent with respect to review of
state action. A claim that a state official has issued or denied a permit
because of a misapplication of the federal statute or regulations would
"aris[e] under" federal law; sovereign immunity would not be a barrier to
an injunctive or declaratory action because the officer allegedly would be
acting beyond his authority;5 7 at least if the amount in controversy ex-
ceeded $10,000,58 there would be district court jurisdiction unless review is
precluded.
Finding a cause of action on the merits might be more difficult. Both
the applicant injured by an erroneous denial and the pollutee injured by
an erroneous grant appear to be within the protective purpose of the
federal law they seek to enforce,59 but that is not always sufficient. 60 The
statute does require that an approved state program "at all times be in
accordance with" section 402 and with guidelines issued under section
304,6 but it explicitly provides two different remedies in case of noncomp-
liance: EPA veto of the individual permit grant 2 and revocation of approv-
al of the state program.63 Nevertheless, the inference that Congress meant
to leave applicants without a remedy for unlawful denial of a permit seems
so harsh as to be highly improbable; and the provision that "compliance
with a permit. . . shall be deemed compliance" with most provisions of the
federal statute,64 coupled with the apparent legislative understanding that
the EPA's veto power would be sparingly exercised,65 is powerful evidence
that some review of an erroneous grant is necessary to carry out the
statutory purpose of sections 304 and 402 of the FWPCA.
But the inference is strong that any such review should be had, subject
to possible Supreme Court supervision, 66 in a state court. The omission of
state permit action from review in federal courts of appeals does not seem
inadvertent, since Congress explicitly provided for such review of identical
federal actions under the same section. No reason appears for thinking
Congress preferred district court review for state permit action, since the
56. Id. § 1369(b).
57. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682-, 698-702 (1949).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). An action charging violation of the statute, and arguably
also one charging violation of regulations under it, would also fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1970), which gives jurisdiction without regard to amount of actions arising under statutes
"regulating commerce," if the interpretation of two courts of appeals is accepted. See, e.g.,
Imm v. Union R.R., 289 F.2d 858, 859-60 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1961); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS
533-34 (2d ed. 1975).
59. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964).
60. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
455-56, 458, 462, 464-65 (1974).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
62. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
63. Id. § 1342(c)(3).
64. Id. § 1342(k).
65. See Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, 541 F.2d 899, 907-09 (2d
Cir. 1976).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
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statute contemplates identical hearings before state and federal agencies.67
If federal review were to be provided, the treatment of comparable federal
action suggests it would have been in the appellate court. The omission,
therefore, is persuasive if not compelling evidence of an intention to
preclude all initial federal court review, especially since the presence of a
state officer as defendant and the probable existence of ancillary state law
issues furnish plausible reasons for such a decision.68
B. Vehicle Emission Standards
Section 307(b) of the CAA provides for review by federal courts of
appeals of new motor vehicle emission standards "other than a standard
required to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)"-in other words, except
for the hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxide standards
applicable to "light-duty vehicles" manufactured during or after "model
year" 1975. Two alternatie inferences may be drawn from this exception,
since it clearly is not an accident: that the excepted standards are review-
able under general federal law in the district courts, or that they are not
reviewable at all. It is difficult to imagine any reason why these standards,
in contrast to other new motor vehicle standards, are more suitable for
pre-enforcement review in the district rather than the circuit courts.
Perhaps a more plausible explanation is that Congress foresaw, first, little
scope for judicial review because the contents of these regulations are very
precisely prescribed in the statute; and second, little time for review be-
cause of the short lead time before compliance was required. Moreover,
Congress may have thought it was providing an ample safety valve in
section 202(b)(5), which allows a one-year extension of the 1977 carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbon standards upon proof of specified hardships.
The denial of an extension is subject to judicial review in the courts of
appeals.
None of these, however, is a sufficient reason for excluding judicial
review altogether. That the 1977 and 1978 light-duty vehicle standards
must require a ninety percent reduction in the exhaust levels of earlier
vehicles by no means eliminates the possibility of disputes over what the
earlier levels were; that thb Administrator's 1975 standards were specifical-
ly incorporated into the statute does not immunize them from constitution-
al attacks, however unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, the extension provi-
sion neither applies to nitrogen oxides, nor allows more than a single year's
67. See FWPCA § 509(a)(1), (b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1), (b)(3) (Supp. V 1975). The EPA
regulations, while providing both a "public hearing" and an "adjudicatory hearing" upon
federally issued permits, see notes 102 and 103 infra, require only the former for state
permits, and then only if there is "a significant public interest." 60 C.F.R. § 124.36 (1976). The
consistency of this provision with the statutory requirement of a "public hearing" in this
adjudicative context seems questionable; in any case the EPA practice is hardly indicative of a
congressional intention to differentiate between state and federal permits, for the statute uses
the same word for both.
68. Cf. Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir.
1976).
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respite, nor permits an attack upon the validity of the regulation. Thus,
there may indeed be occasions for judicial review of these standards.
That pre-enforcement review may be obstructed by the pressures of
time does not mean that a manufacturer subjected to sanctions for violat-
ing the standards should be prohibited from challenging them at that time;
indeed the- assumption of Yakus v. United States69 is that, at least where
judicial enforcement is sought, he must be allowed to do so unless he has
had an adequate prior opportunity. In contrast to the situation involving
state permit action under the FWPCA, state court review does not seem a
realistic possibility. 70 The serious constitutional question that would be
posed if the EPA were permitted to impose sanctions for violations of
regulations that were never subject to challenge, and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the APA as requiring a "clear and convincing" showing of
intent to preclude judicial review, suggest that nonstatutory review of the
emission standards excepted from section 307 is not precluded.
C. Enforcement Notices and Orders
One case in which nonstatutory review was held unavailable is West
Penn Power Co. v. Train.71 West Penn had been served with a thirty-day
notice for violation of implementation plan provisions respecting particu-
lates and sulfur oxides. It filed an action in the district court, alleging that it
was in compliance with the plan. 2 The court of appeals correctly held that,
because the validity of the plan was not under attack, the action was not
barred by section 307's thirty-day limitation or venue provisions. 73
Nevertheless, the court gave three reasons for holding that the action could
not be maintained: The notice of violation was not a "final" agency action
as required by the APA; whether to enforce the notice by further adminis-
trative or judicial proceedings was committed to the Administrator's discre-
tion; and in any event the APA provided no basis for jurisdiction to
challenge administrative action.74
In holding the notice not "final" the court paid no heed to the compel-
ling argument of the dissent that the company found itself in a serious
dilemma: it must either accede to the EPA's interpretation of the plan,
which meant installing an expensive scrubber, or it must risk penalties and
a possible shutdown if its own interpretation turned out to be wrong.75 The
case was as ripe for decision as if the dispute had been over the validity of
69. 321 U.S. 414, 439, 444 (1944).
70. It is difficult to imagine any reason why Congress might have wanted these regula-
tions to be reviewed in state rather than in federal courts, as both the defendant and the
governing law are federal. Indeed the jurisdiction of state courts over federal officers in
injunctive proceedings is highly doubtful. See, e.g., McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
598, 603-05 (1821) (mandamus); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp.
578, 579-80, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1959); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 630-34 (2d ed. 1975).
71. 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975).
72. Id. at 305-06.
73. Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 310-11.
75. Id. at 318 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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the regulation itself. 76 Thus even if the notice was not "final" agency action,
there was an "actual controversy" between the parties over the interpreta-
tion of the implementation plan, and for such controversies the Declara-
tory Judgment Act 77 affords a remedy-provided, of course, there is
jurisdiction.
That the EPA "may" rather than "must" follow up a thirty-day notice
with an order or complaint would be highly relevant if a plaintiff sought to
compel EPA to take enforcement action, for the inevitable defense would
be that the Administrator had discretion not to proceed. West Penn,
however, made no such claim. Its position was that the EPA had no
authority to enforce its interpretation of the plan, for West Penn was not in
violation. That the EPA has discretion not to sue those who are in violation
does not mean it has discretion to sue those who are not; actions against
prosecutors with the usual discretion not to prosecute are common when
the plaintiff alleges there is no right to prosecute at all.7"
The court's third argument was that the APA provided no jurisdic-
tional basis. The Supreme Court has since agreed, 79 but the jurisdictional
problem has been solved by the removal of the amount requirement in
actions against federal officers.80
One court has gone so far as to refuse to determine whether a plaintiff
was in violation of an implementation plan provision after the EPA had
issued an order against it.81 In part this conclusion was erroneously based
upon section 307's provision for exclusive appellate court jurisdiction to
review the validity of the plan. But the court also found judicial review of
orders precluded by the Act's failure to provide explicitly for review. First,
the court argued, the statute represented a "strong congressional desire to
protect the public health"; second, a provision for such review had been
deleted from the bill by the Conference Committee "follow[ing] discussion
in the Senate of the need for a simple, direct method of enforcement and
the need to issue an immediate cease-and-desist order to protect the public
health."8 2
The court's reasoning is unpersuasive. That public health was at stake
gives us no clue as to Congress' intentions on judicial review; the leading
case refusing to find preclusion of review by silence arose under a statute
protecting public health.83 The provision deleted from the earlier Senate
bill did not quite authorize judicial review, since it merely stated that
compliance with an order would not have "foreclose[d]" a suit to challenge
the order. Arguably the detailed venue provision included for such suits
76. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 152-53; National Automatic Laundry
& Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
79. Califano v. Sanders, 97 S. Ct. 980 (1977).
80. See note 49 supra.
81. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 9 ERC 1265, 1269-71 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
82. Id.
83. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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indicated more than a desire to leave the matter to general law, but quite
clearly the reason for the reference to review was the fear that in its absence
one would have to risk penalties in order to make a challenge.8 4 The
omission of this provision in conference is as consistent with the conclusion
that it was unnecessary, or that compliance should moot review, as with the
conclusion that review was meant to be excluded. The "discussion in the
Senate" preceding deletion in fact took place during a committee hearing
on a different bill that said nothing about judicial review, long before any
action by the Senate on either bill; while one party to the discussion argued
that the EPA should be able to enter an order without prior hearing, there
was no suggestion that judicial review should be barred.85 In light of the
APA's presumption of reviewability, especially after Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,8 6 far more evidence of intention to exclude judicial review should
be necessary.
The present law is adequate to afford a forum in both the cases just
discussed, but the danger that one so seriously in need of judicial guidance
can be denied it by misinterpretation of that law suggests the desirability of
an amendment to make clear the power of the district courts to resolve
actual controversies over the interpretation of implementation plans or
other regulations under the pollution laws.87
D. The Notice Requirement
Quite a different problem of nonstatutory review was raised by Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train.8" NRDC sued to compel the Ad-
ministrator to issue effluent guidelines within the deadlines of section 304
of the FWPCA. It had neglected to give the EPA the sixty-day notice
required by the citizen-suit provision of section 505, but the court held
jurisdiction lay under the APA: section 505 was intended to increase, not to
contract judicial review, and its explicit saving clause made clear that it did
not preclude actions that could otherwise be brought under other laws.8 9
The trouble with this reasoning is that it undermines the flat statutory
requirement of prior notice to the EPA. It is one thing to hold that section
505 is not meant to make unreviewable actions that fall outside its purview,
or to make unavailable remedies, such as damages, that it does not afford.
But to hold that Congress by a general saving clause intended to allow
precisely the relief authorized by section 505 to be pursued against the
precise actions enumerated in that section without compliance with the
84. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 98 (1970).
85. 2 SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 1005-06 (1974).
86. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
87. The Administrative Conference Committee on Judicial Review decided not to pro-
pose a recommendation to that effect, doubting its necessity and its efficiency in resolving
concrete cases.
88. 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 700-01; accord, NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79,83-84 (2d Cir. 1975); Conserva-
tion Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 938-39 & n.62 (2d Cir. 1974).
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conditions carefully attached by the statute is another matter. Congress
evidently thought notice to the Administrator served an important purpose
in affording an opportunity for administrative enforcement that might
avoid the need for court action; 90 that purpose may be frustrated by the
NRDC decision whenever an alternative jurisdictional basis can be found
for the identical action that falls within section 505. The court did soften
the blow by acknowledging that the failure to give notice would be held a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies when there was "reason to
believe that further agency consideration may resolve the dispute and
obviate the need for further judicial action." 91 This approach transforms
Congress' clear and flat rule into a matter of court judgment on the facts of
each case, which may unnecessarily promote litigation; and there is no
assurance that all courts upholding nonstatutory jurisdiction will take the
same view of exhaustion. 92 1 would not have held the notice provision could
so easily be evaded; the statutes should be amended to assure that it may
not be in the future.9 3
II. ACTIONS REVIEWABLE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Adjudications
Direct appellate review of formal administrative adjudications, such as
cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 9" has long been
standard practice: because the agency's action is to be judged by the
administrative record, there is no need for a trial, and thus no need for
prior resort to a district court.95 Since enforcement under the pollution
laws is essentially entrusted to the courts, 6 formal agency adjudication is
not so prominent here as it is under many statutes. Decisions on formal
adjudicative records are, however, required with respect to postponement
of the date for compliance with an air quality implementation plan under
section 110(f) 97 and suspension or revocation of certificates of motor vehi-
cle emission compliance under section 206(b) of the CAA.98 In both cases
direct review is expressly authorized in the courts of appeals.99
90. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
91. 510 F.2d at 703.
92. Exhaustion was not mentioned in any of the decisions cited in note 89 supra.
93. The Administrative Conference is in agreement with this position. Recommendations
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recom-
mendation No. 76-4, C) [hereinafter cited as ACUS Recommendations 1976].
94. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
95. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1
C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No. 75-3, 5) [hereinafter cited as ACUS Recom-
mendations 1975]; Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Forum, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Currie &
Goodman].
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). These same sections
provide for administrative enforcement orders, but without requiring a hearing. Consequent-
ly, on review of such orders, a trial court hearing on adjudicative facts is likely to be required
by due process. See Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 A.B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 365, 403.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
98. Id. § 1857f-5(b).
99. CAA §§ 110(f), 307(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(f), 1857h-5(b) (1970).
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1. NPDES Permits
Direct appellate review is also authorized with respect to "the Adminis-
trator's action ... in issuing or denying any permit" under section 402 of
the FWPCA.' 0 The statutory requirement that the Administrator afford
an "opportunity for public hearing" before taking such action l l appears to
make this a sensible provision, for in this adjudicatory context "public
hearing" would seem to contemplate decision on a trial-type record. The
EPA's regulations, however, while providing both for an apparently legisla-
tive "public hearing"'0 2 and for an "adjudicatory" one upon proper re-
quest,10 3 authorize the Administrator in reviewing the initial decision of his
subordinate to decide "on the basis of the record and any other considera-
tion he deems relevant."10 4 Whether this striking provision squares any
better with the statute than it does with principles of fair and orderly
procedure may be doubted. If it does, it may force the reviewing court to
allow a further hearing, which the court of appeals is in a poor position to
provide. I suspect, however, that the occasions on which the Administrator
goes outside the record will be rare enough not to impair the general
principle of direct appellate review; and in any event it is the offending
regulation, not the statutory review provision, that ought to be amended.
Nevertheless there is reason to suggest a reservation with respect to
direct appellate review of permit actions under section 402. One recent
estimate places the number of potential permit applications as high as
75,000,105 and many may involve questions of significance only in the
particular case. Permit appeals therefore may prove to fall within that
exceptional class of formal adjudications for which the Administrative
Conference has recommended initial district court review "in the interest
of conserving the scarce and overextended resources of the Federal appel-
late system."' 0 6 Delegation of permit authority to the states 0 7 should re-
duce the number of permit appeals, 10 8 and the scope of issues open at the
permit stage is still an unresolved question. 109 It seems too early to make a
final assessment of the desirability of district court review, but an amend-
ment may be in order if permit cases begin to impose a heavy burden on
100. FWPCA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (Supp. V 1975).
101. Id. § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 125.34 (1976). This hearing is to be held only if there is "a significant
degree of public interest."
103. Id. § 125.36. Such a hearing is mandatory on request of any "person. . .having an
interest which may be affected."
104. Id. § 125.36(n)(12).
105. See NRDC v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642, 646 n.l1 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. ACUS Recommendations 1975, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No.
75-3, g). See also Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 18-19, 24-25.
107. FWPCA § 402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c) (Supp. V 1975).
108. See Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir.
1976); text accompanying notes 110-20 infra.
109. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1027-28 (4th Cir.
1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977).
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the courts of appeals. In any event, the problem should be a transitory one;
the flood of applications should decline to a trickle after sources now in
existence receive their permits.
The provision for reviewing the issuance or denial of a permit also
poses a question of interpretation. While it is clear enough that state action
with respect to section 402 permits is not reviewable in the courts of
appeals,n the Administrator has authority to veto state issuance of such a
permit. I In Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator,"2 the Sec-
ond Circuit held his failure to exercise that authority was not "the Adminis-
trator's action . . .in issuing or denying . . . [a] permit" within section
509(b). In reaching this conclusion the court opined that "the option to
take no action" appeared to be "committed to the Administrator's almost
unfettered discretion," citing legislative history to indicate that the veto
power should be sparingly exercised and a statutory provision authorizing
its waiver without specifying on what grounds." 3 Emphasizing, moreover,
that "the federal agency took no action at all," it quoted from a related
district court opinion: "The mere failure to disapprove a state administra-
tive action cannot be deemed decisionmaking by a federal body." 1 4 The
result cannot clearly be said to embody either the conclusion that the
failure to veto was insulated from review by the APA provision for actions
"committed to agency discretion by law"'' 5 or the thesis that inaction is
necessarily excluded from section 509, for it seems a cross between the two:
"Such inaction, predicated upon the statute's express design, can hardly be
described as 'Administrator's action . . in issuing . . [a] permit'
V1116
The decision was probably right, though neither theory suggested by
the court is beyond argument. One may question whether the waiver
provision should really be construed to permit the EPA to refuse altogether
to carry out a reviewing function Congress undeniably saw fit to confer." 7
And since an explicit decision not to veto would appear to be EPA "action"
for purposes of judicial review," 8 it is arguable that review under section
110. Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, 541 F.2d 899, 902-06 (2d Cir.
1976).
111. FWPCA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
112. 541 F.2d at 906-10.
113. The waiver provision provides that "[tihe Administrator may, as to any permit
application, waive paragraph (2) of this subsection." FWPCA § 402(d)(3), 33 U.S.C. §
1342(d)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
114. 541 F.2d at 909, quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
116. 541 F.2d at 909.
117. Cf. NRDC v. Train, 9 ERC 1425 (2d Cir. 1976), which directed institution of
proceedings leading to the issuance of an air quality standard for lead despite a provision that
the Administrator need do so only for those pollutants "for which. . . he plans to issue air
quality criteria." CAA § 108(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1)(C) (1970).
118. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6), (13) (1970), incorporated by reference in § 701(a)(2) of the
same title with respect to judicial review:" 'agency action' includes. . . an agency. . .order,"
id. § 551(13), while" 'order' means .. a final disposition, whether affirmative [or] negative
in form," id. § 551(b).
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509 should not be evaded simply because, for identical reasons, the Agency
has chosen to achieve the same result without entering an order. The-
failure to act at all, however, is generally dealt with separately under the
provision for citizen suits in the district courts,11 9 presumably because in
such cases there will usually be no formal administrative record. That a
formal hearing record may accompany a state agency's denial of a permit
application 120 should not be decisive, as the word "action" in section 509
applies as well to other situations in which inaction would mean no record,
and the citizen suit lies whether there is a record or not. Moreover, even if
the Administrator has taken "action" by failing to act, he has neither
"issu[ed]" nor "den[ied]" a permit, as section 509 seems to require; nor
would he have done so by entering an order expressly declining to block
the state's issuance of the permit. This difficulty also makes somewhat
questionable the court's dictum acknowledgment, and the EPA's conces-
sion, that the court of appeals could review the Administrator's actual veto
of the issuance of a state permit, though in light of the policy of section 509
such action might be held a "den[ial]." Review of the Administrator's veto
authority in the district courts would present problems of its own that were
not addressed in Mianus.
These problems of interpretation are perhaps too minor to justify
congressional attention, but neither the scope of discretion in exercising
the veto power, nor the availability of judicial review of that exercise,
appears to have been adequately thought through. Since the EPA's action
or failure to act is presumably to be based upon the state hearing record, it
seems reasonable, subject to the concern expressed above with regard to
permit review generally, that such review as is allowed be had in the courts
of appeals.
2. Other Adjudications
The statutes are silent on judicial review of the issuance or denial of
dredge deposit or sludge discharge permits under sections 404 and 405 of
the FWPCA,' 2 1 and of two-year waivers of hazardous pollutant require-
ments to enable individual sources to install controls under section 112 of
the CAA.122 Dredge permits are subject to a hearing requirement that
makes them theoretically analogous, for review purposes, to permits under
section 402, although they probably will be far less numerous. Sludge
permits, inexplicably, are not subject to a hearing requirement, nor are
section 112 waivers; in such cases, absent an EPA regulation prescribing
hearings, 123 a judicial hearing is likely to be necessary on facts peculiar to
119. FWPCA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975).
120. Id. § 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3).
121. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1345.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1970).
123. The regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.10-61.11 (1976), provide for decisions regarding
waivers under the hazardous substances provision to be based initially upon the written
submission of the applicant. If the request is to be denied, the EPA must provide the applicant
with "notice of the information and findings upon which such intended denial is based" and
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the applicant, thus making the district court the better forum. It would be
better to have such hearings before the expert agency itself, with review in
the courts of appeals, unless the unimportance of the matter or the number
of prospective appeals counsels otherwise.
Direct appellate review is provided for orders in response to applica-
tions to postpone compliance with vehicle emission standards under section
202(b)(5) of the CAA.124 Though the "public hearing" required in the latter
instance has been held to be a "legislative" one,125 in practice it seems to
have produced an adequate record for direct review, 126 and the obvious
importance of the determination makes avoidance of the district court
desirable on efficiency grounds.
B. Rulemaking
Direct appellate review of informal rulemaking is a relatively recent
innovation 127 made practicable by the increasing tendency of courts and
Congress to require agencies to base regulations on materials that are
before them 128 and on the recognition that a trial-type hearing may be
unnecessary to establish "legislative" facts129 even if brought out for the
first time in a reviewing court. 3 0
The pollution statutes are in accord with this modern trend; most of
the actions subject to direct appellate review are regulations adopted with-
out formal hearings. Not every such regulation, however, is included, and
it is not always easy to determine which are. One obvious omission, already
discussed,'3 ' is the light-duty vehicle emission standards; since they seem as
appropriate for direct review as do other vehicle standards for which such
review is provided, it would be proper to make them reviewable in the
courts of appeals.3 2 Other omissions and interpretive problems will now be
addressed.
afford the opportunity for presentation of "additional information or arguments," apparently
in writing.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5); see CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
125. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
126. See id.
127. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950), construing a
provision for direct review of FPC "orders" not to include regulations because "an appellate
court has no intelligible basis for decision unless a subordinate tribunal has made a record
fully encompassing the issues." Id. at 599. But the United Gas Pipe Line doctrine is in decline
today. Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 39-40.
128, E.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970) (construed in
Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.
1973)); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 379-87 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (new
source performance standards, CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970)).
129. See K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
130. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 39-54. This method of review, under
appropriate circumstances, has been endorsed by the Administrative Conference. ACUS
Recommendations 1975, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No. 75-3, g).
131. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
132. The Conference has so recommended. ACUS Recommendations 1976,41 Fed. Reg.
56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, E(2)),
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1. Disapproval or Decision Not to Adopt Regulations
In Utah International, Inc. v. EPA 133 the Tenth Circuit held that section
307 of the CAA did not authorize direct review by the courts of appeals of
the Administrator's disapproval of a state plan for the implementation of
air quality standards. 34 The statute ambiguously provides for review of
"action in approving" plans, 35 which could refer either to actual approval
alone or to the Administrator's decision either way on the approval ques-
tion. The Tenth Circuit held that section 307 incorporated the usual
limitation of review to final action'3 6 and that rejection of a state plan
under the circumstances was not final:
[T]he effect of a disapproval order under the Clean Air Act is to reopen
the administrative process. . . . [U]ntil such time as the E.P.A. promul-
gates its own plan, after allowing the state an opportunity to come up with
a revised plan of its own, there is no final applicable [sic] order under the
statute.137
The court added it thought it "doubtful" that the case was ripe for review
under the principles of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.38
The decision is supported by the considerations that underlie the
related doctrines of ripeness, finality, and exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as well as the federal presumption against interlocutory appeals
from trial courts. 39 While approval of a state plan, like the adoption of
another self-executing regulation in Abbott, imposes obligations upon the
affected polluter that place him in the dilemma of risky disobedience or
costly compliance, disapproval ordinarily does not; and the controversy
may be mooted in the course of remaining proceedings to determine the
contents of the substitute federal plan. Ordinary principles of finality, as
the Tenth Circuit has held, should be read into section 307.
This is not to say, however, that "action in approving or promulgating"
plans should be held to exclude every plan disapproval. If the EPA dis-
approves a plan revision proposed by a state on its own initiative, its action
will often be final: no further administrative proceedings are necessarily
contemplated, and the existing plan remains in effect. Similarly, if the
Administrator after a full notice-and-comment proceeding finally decides
not to adopt any regulation at all, there will be an adequate record for
resolving in the court of appeals any contention that he was required to do
so.'4° Policy therefore counsels construing the references to "action . . . in
promulgating" standards or "in approving" plans in section 307 of the
133. 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973).
134. Id. at 127.
135. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
136. The APA makes reviewable "final agency action" and other "agency action made
reviewable by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
137. 478 F.2d at 127-28.
138. 387 U.S. 136 (1967), cited in 478 F.2d at 128.
139. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1970).
140. He may have had discretion to adopt no standard at all, but the court of appeals can
decide the extent of that discretion as well as the district court.
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CAA and in section 509 of the FWPCA to include final action either way on
the question of approval. The alternative of total unreviewability is not
lightly to be inferred, and district court review is unpalatable; there is no
reason the outcome before the Administrator should determine the forum
for judicial review. The proper interpretation of these provisions could be
facilitated by amending them to afford review of "final action. . with
respect to approval or promulgation" of standards or plans. Nevertheless,
the courts have so far done well with the existing language despite its
ambiguity.
2. Implementation Plan Extensions
Although the CAA provides for direct appellate review of decisions
respecting postponement of the date by which an individual source must
comply with an implementation plan (section 110 (f)), it says nothing about
review of the decision whether or not to extend the date for compliance
with the ambient standard itself under section 110(e). Nevertheless, the
courts of appeals, without discussion, have entertained challenges both to
the grant141 and to the denial142 of section 110(e) extensions in the course
of reviewing implementation plans under section 307. This practice seems
clearly correct. There is no reason to think Congress intended this decision
to be either unreviewable or reviewable in the district courts. Since the
deadline determines the length of time in which the ambient standard is to
be implemented, and since the extension decision is made at the time the
Administrator passes upon the plan, a state request for extension of the
date is realistically a part of its implementation plan, and its approval is
therefore subject to review under section 307. Conversely, when the Ad-
ministrator refuses the extension and promulgates a plan of his own, the
refusal can be challenged as an attack upon the compliance schedules in the
federal plan.
3. Emission Standards
Another question about the coverage of section 307 was raised in
United States v. Big Chief, Inc. 4 Charged with the criminal violation of a
federal regulation requiring the wetting of asbestos materials prior to
building demolition, Big Chief attempted to challenge the validity of the
regulation in federal district court. Section 307, however, provides for
exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review any "emission
standard" under section 112, the hazardous pollutant provision, under
which the demolition rule had been promulgated. Though it ultimately
upheld the regulation on the merits, the court made clear it thought its
jurisdiction was precluded by section 307: to limit direct appellate review to
numerical standards "would frustrate the plain legislative purpose behind
141. NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1974).
142. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 318 (5th Cir. 1974).
143. 7 ERC 1840 (E.D. La. 1975).
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the review provision. 144 The thrust of the review provision, the court
correctly intimated, was to provide review of any regulations adopted
purportedly under the emission standard authority of section 112.145
4. Effluent Guidelines
Section 301(b) of the FWPCA provides that "there shall be achieved"
by specified types of sources "effluent limitations" requiring application by
1977 of "the best practicable control technology currently available," and
by 1983 of "the best available technology economically achievable," in
either case "as defined" or "as determined" by the Administrator "pursuant
to section 304(b)." The latter section, in turn, directs the Administrator,
"for the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this
Act," to adopt "regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations"
that describe the effluents to be obtained upon use of the best practicable
and best available technology. The Administrator adopted effluent
guidelines for corn wet milling plants. In CPC International, Inc. v. Train,146
a large corn processor challenged the guidelines directly in the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Section 509 says nothing about judicial
review of guidelines promulgated under section 304, but the EPA took the
position that they were within section 509's provision for appellate review
of "effluent limitation[s]. . . under § 301(b)."'1 47 The court dismissed the
suit for lack of jurisdiction. 148
Section 301, the court concluded, did not authorize the promulgation
of effluent limitations by regulation. By forbidding issuance of a discharge
permit "outside the guidelines," section 402(d)(2) was said to demonstrate
that the permit-issuing authority is to follow the guidelines promulgated
under section 304(b), and is not to refer to independent regulations pro-
mulgated under section 301.149 Legislative history was mustered: an EPA
administrator had testified that "effluent limitations required by Section
301 would be established and applied to all point sources. . . by means of
the permits issued under Titie IV.'15 0 In short, the effluent limitations to
be established under section 301 were those in individual permits granted
under section 402, not the section 304 guidelines upon which those permit
limitations were to be based.
144. Id. at 1841.
145. Id. The Sixth Circuit, rejecting the feeble contention that § 307 applied only to
procedural attacks on the promulgation of a regulation, has held the same regulation not
reviewable in a criminal proceeding. United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1, 4-6
(6th Cir. 1976). On the issue raised in Big Chief it said only, "[W]e see nothing inconsistent
with the purposes of this statute in the Administrator's promulgaton of a 'work practice' as a
condition of an emission standard which, absent fulfillment of the work practice conditions,
otherwise prohibits any emission. ... Id. at 6 n.2.
146. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
147. Id. at 1037.
148. Id. at 1052; accord, CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1331 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1976)
(dictum).
149. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1975).
150. Id. at 1039.
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This is a possible interpretation of the statute, but a singularly unap-
pealing one. The court's distinction between section 301 limitations and
section 304 guidelines is highly artificial; the court conceded that the sole
purpose of the latter was to define the former. The Senate Report, 'which
the court quoted, was quite explicit: "[T]hese [section 304] guidelines
would define the effluent limitations required by the first and second
phases of the program established under section 301.'' What seems to
have motivated CPC in arguing that section 304 guidelines were not re-
viewable as section 301 limitations was the substantive argument that the
limitations embodied in permits are to vary according to individual cir-
cumstances. The jurisdictional and uniformity questions, however, are
separable; one court has held the EPA may promulgate section 301 limita-
tions by regulation so long as they allow flexibility at the permit stage. 5 2
Despite the Eighth Circuit's disclaimer, its interpretation seems to
make the explicit provision for review of the approval or promulgation of
"effluent limitation[s]. . . under section 301" almost without independent
significance. If the only such limitations are those contained in individual
permits, they are all reviewable anyway under the section 307 provision re-
specting the issuance or denial of any permit. The CPC court argued that
there was no redundancy because "[t]he reference to § 301 is necessary if
the Administrator's action under § 301 (c), modifying the application of the
1983 requirements to certain point sources, is to be subject to judicial
review."-53 Apparently such determinations are to be made outside the
permit process, when that process has been delegated to the state. Yet this
cannot be the sole office of section 509's reference to section 301, since "the
legislative history shows quite clearly that section 301(c), which was only
added during the House-Senate Conference, did not even exist at the time
[the review provision] was originally drafted."' 5 4 Moreover, to limit the
reference to section 301(c) determinations would, as the Supreme Court
has since said, produce the anomalous situation in which the courts of
appeals would review individual actions while regulations of general ap-
plicability were reviewed in the district courts. I55
In policy terms the CPC holding can only be described as a minor
disaster. Nowhere does the court begin to intimate why Congress might
have wanted to omit the section 304 guidelines from review by the courts of
appeals. The same questions concededly will be subject to review there
151. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971).
152. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
153. 515 F.2d at 1043.
154. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1037 (3d Cir. 1975).
Section 301(f) also bans the discharge of certain biological warfare agents and radioactive
waste, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(0 (Supp. V 1975), and the court in CPC read it to outlaw all
discharges without permits. 515 F.2d at 1042-43. While these provisions might be considered
effluent limitations, but see American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1038 ("section
301(f) is not an 'effluent limitation,' but rather a flat prohibition on all such discharges"), they
are not limitations "approved" or "promulgated" by the Administrator; they are prescribed by
the statute itself. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (Supp. V 1975).
155. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965, 975 (1977).
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when the guidelines are applied to individual permits. There is no reason
to believe there will be any greater difficulty in establishing the relevant
facts than in reviewing other regultions promulgated after the identical
notice-and-comment procedure. Any suggestion that the guidelines might
not be ripe for review until applied to the individual in his permit was
torpedoed by the court's flat dictum that the guidelines were reviewable in
the district courts under general law. 156
The CPC case itself most graphically illustrates the inconsistency and
waste of the review system it created. As is its practice, the EPA had
proposed and adopted simultaneously four sets of effluent requirements
for corn wet milling plants: new source performance standards under
section 306(b), pretireatment standards for discharges into municipal sew-
ers under section 307(c), and guidelines for best practicable and best
available technology under section 304. CPC challenged all four; the court
reviewed the first two on the merits while declining jurisdiction over the
challenge to the existing source regulations. 157 It is not as if the several
standards were unrelated. They all affect the same processes of the same
industry; the court that masters the industrial facts well enough to pass on
one standard has a head start in passing on the others. Indeed, the corn
milling standard for new plants, which the court did review, was identical
to the 1983 guideline for existing plants, which it refused to review.
Moreover, the new source standard was premised upon use of the technol-
ogy the Administrator had prescribed in his 1977 existing plant guidelines,
plus deep-bed filtration. In passing upon the new source standard, the
court found it necessary to determine that the technology required by the
1977 guidelines it refused to review was in fact adequate to meet the
guideline. This is not to say that the court fully resolved the validity of the
guidelines on the merits, for it might still have been open to argument that
technology available for new plants could not practicably be incorporated
into existing ones. But the overlap of issues was enormous, and the waste of
effort in requiring an entirely new challenge to the guidelines in the district
court was unforgivable.
The CPC court's refusal to consider section 304 guidelines to be
section 301 effluent limitations is not compelled by the statutory language
or history, is not supported by any conceivable statutory policy, and makes
a total shambles of the review process. Five other courts of appeals have
since disagreed with CPC's jurisdictional ruling, 58 a sixth court has disag-
reed with its reasoning, 159 and the House has passed a bill to make it
156. 515 F.2d at 1034. See also 540 F.2d at 1331 n.I.
157. The existing source regulations in fact have since been reviewed by a district court.
Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
158. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chems.
& Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir.
1975).
159. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) upheld on the
merits EPA's authority to promulgate effluent limitations under § 301 by regulation without
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explicit that section 304 guidelines are reviewable in the courts of ap-
peals. 6 ' The Supreme Court has recently addressed this question. It has
held that the EPA has authority to promulgate effluent limitations by
regulation under section 301, so that review in the courts of appeals follows
as a matter of course. 16' While this decision allows the EPA to assure direct
appellate review by using the section 301 label, it leaves open the possible
denial of such review if the Agency should choose to adopt section 304
guidelines without that label, as apparently it means to do whenever time
permits.162 There is thus still a need to provide for appellate review of such
guidelines.
5. Credit for Polluted Intake
In reviewing effluent guidelines for the iron and steel industry the
Third Circuit in American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA 16, (AISI 1) declared
that "any individual point source should be entitled to an adjustment in an
effluent limitation. . . if it can show that its inability to meet the limitation
is attributable to significant amounts of pollutants in the intake water."'
64
The EPA adopted regulations so providing, and the Third Circuit refused
to review them in American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA165 (AISI 11): "We
agree with the EPA's analysis that the Net-Gross Regulations do no more
than prescribe the policy and procedures to be followed in connection with
applications for permits."'166 Because these regulations "[did] not in them-
selves restrict quantities, rates, or concentrations"' 167 of pollutants, they
were not "effluent limitations" within section 509(b) as the statute defines
them; 168 because they "[did] not specify the factors to be considered. . . in
determining control measures to be utilized by individual point sources,"'
69
they were not even "effluent guidelines" under section 304. The court went
on to cast doubt even on the reviewability of the regulations in the district
court, even though that question was not before it: ". . . without the
original gross limitations before us, the modifications, if any, which may be
discussing jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit in American Petroleum Inst. avoided deciding
whether § 301 gave the Administrator power to adopt limitations by regulation, finding it
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes that he had purported to act under § 301.
160. S. 2710, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 18 (House version), 122 CONG. REc. H5285, H5288
(daily ed. June 3, 1976). EPA, justly complaining that the GPG decision results in both
"bifurcated" review and "at least a one-year delay," has asked Congress to overrule the
decision. The Natural Resources Defense Council agrees. See 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1692
(1976). See also ACUS Recommendations 1976,41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation
No. 76-4, E(1)(b)).
161. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965, 974 (1977).
162. Id. at 972-73, 975-76.
163. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
164. Id. at 1056.
165. 543 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1976).
166. Id. at 526.
167. Id. at 527.
168. "The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction ... on quantities, rates, and
concentrations of ... constituents which are discharged from point sources .... 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11) (Supp. V 1975).
169. 543 F.2d at 529.
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effected by the operation of the Net-Gross Regulations are both incalcul-
able and unintelligible."' 7
0
The court's concern for the abstract nature of the controversy is
exaggerated. The question of background credit is a readily comprehen-
sible one that seems resolvable on the basis of the statute itself, without
reference to the particular figures in any individual effluent guideline;
171
and that is how the EPA treated it in adopting a general regulation. Yet the
other half of the Supreme Court's test for the ripeness of administrative
action 172 appears not to be met: the "Net-Gross" regulations have no impact
on the discharger until effluent guidelines applicable to him have also been
adopted or a permit sought. 73 The iron and steel guidelines, remanded to
the EPA earlier by the Third Circuit, had not been reissued when the
background regulations were challenged. 174
Once the guidelines reappear, however, it would be unfortunate to
make appellate reviewability of the background regulations depend upon
whether the guidelines expressly incorporate them, as the opinion sug-
gests. The Third Circuit itself passed on the question of background credit
when it reviewed the original iron and steel guidelines, 175 and other courts
have properly reviewed the net-gross regulations in determining the validi-
ty of effluent guidelines for other industries.1 76 Regardless of the form of
words used, the intake credit rules help to define the discharger's obliga-
tion under the effluent limitation itself and thus can readily be held to be,
in effect, part of the various effluent limitations. Moreover, contrary to
what the court said, those rules seem to do precisely what section 304
guidelines are supposed to do: they specify a factor-the presence of
untreatable pollutants in the intake water-"to be taken into account in
determining the control measures and practices to be applicable to point
sources." 177 It follows from my argument regarding the CPC case that they
should be held reviewable in the court of appeals. In any event the statute
too easily lends itself to the court's construction. It should be amended to
provide for direct review of all final action respecting regulations relating to
effluent limitations under section 301.178
170. Id. at 527-28.
171. See Currie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 496 &
n.157 (1975).
172. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148-49.
173. See text accompanying notes 133-39 supra; cf. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126,
128 (10th Cir. 1973).
174. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 543 F.2d at 524 & n.6.
175. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1056.
176. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361 (4th Cir. 1976); American
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1034 (10th Cir. 1976); Hooker Chems. & Plastics
Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 633 (2d Cir. 1976).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
178. The second AISI decision came down too late for consideration by the Committee on
Judicial Review; consequently no proposed recommendation on the subject was presented to
the Conference.
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6. Water Quality Standards
Conspicuously missing from the review provisions of section 509(b) is
the Administrator's approval or promulgation of water quality standards
under section 303.17 Section 301, however, requires among other things
compliance with any "limitation. . .required to implement any applicable
water quality standard established pursuant to this [Act]."' 80 My analysis of
the CPC case raises the question whether the reference to water quality
standards in section 301 renders those standards subject also to judicial
review under section 509 as "effluent limitation[s] or other limitation[s]
under section [301]."181 The Second Circuit has held, correctly I think, that
it does not182 The text immediately implies a distinction between water
quality standards themselves and "limitation[s] . . .required to imple-
ment" them. Even if the standards are "other limitations" within section
509, it is only the regulations implementing them that must be met under
section 301.
The Second Circuit described the omission of water quality standards
from section 509 as "odd"; 183 it should be rectified.'8 4 As the court noted in
seeking possible reasons for the omission, such standards differ from
effluent guidelines in that they "apply only in a single state and have less
direct effect on individual enterprises."'' 8 5 The latter, however, is equally
true of air quality standards and the former of plans for their implementa-
tion; both are reviewable in the courts of appeals. Moreover, neither fact
seems of great force in determining whether review should be in a district
rather than circuit court. That the standard is local argues for review in the
various circuits as opposed to the District of Columbia, and its indirect
impact argues that review in any forum may be premature. Section 303
does not specify what procedure either a state or the Administrator is to
follow with regard to water quality standards; it is possible therefore that
the record on review may be somewhat less adequate than in the case of air
quality standards, which are the result of notice-and-comment proce-
dure. 86 On the other hand, the silence of the FWPCA with respect to
procedure seems more likely to be taken to mean that the notice-and-
comment requirements of the APA187 apply; 88 the disputed decisions
179. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. V 1975).
180. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
181. Id, § 1369(b)(1)(E).
182. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1976).
183. Id. at 518.
184. The Conference has so recommended. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, E(1)(a)).
185. 538 F.2d at 517.
186. CAA § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a) (1970).
187. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
188. See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970): "Subsequent statute may not be held to supersede or
modify this subchapter [containing the notice and comment requirements] ... except to the
extent that it does so expressly." See Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 170-71 (6th
Cir. 1973), holding § 553 applicable to EPA approval of implementation plans.
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under the CAA that rejected this conclusion 189 were based largely upon the
express provision for a state hearing on such plans' 9 that would have made
a federal proceeding duplicative. Futhermore, the relevant facts are legisla-
tive; they can if necessary be brought out in the court of appeals without a
trial-type hearing.
Section 303(e) of the FWPCA provides for state submission of a "con-
tinuous planning process," to be approved by the EPA if it "will result in
plans" providing, among other things, for "adequate implementation...
for revised or new water quality standards."'19 1 If the Administrator were to
pass upon the implementation plans themselves, the effluent standards
they contained would, under the reasoning I have applied to the CPC case,
be reviewable under section 509 as effluent limitations approved by the
Administrator under section 301. The apparent gap between the "plan-
ning process" that the EPA is to approve and the actual implementation
plan the state is thereafter to adopt, however, introduces a complication:
the limitations in the state plan evidently will not themselves be approved
by the EPA and thus will fall outside section 509. Moreover, because no
federal action is involved, the implication may be that there is no review in
the district courts either, 192 although the possibility of federal court en-
forcement proceedings under section 301 suggests the contrary. Whether
the limitations are necessary or sufficient to achieve the water quality
standards will presumably be reviewable in the appropriate state or federal
court when they are incorporated into a permit. 93 The principle problem
here is attributable to the substantive division of labor between state and
federal agencies, not to the provisions for judicial review.
Z Other Omissions
Section 211 of the CAA authorizes the Administrator by regulation to
require registration and to "control" or to "prohibit" the manufacture or
sale of any motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive. 194 Although section 307
authorizes review by courts of appeals of "any control or prohibition"
respecting fuels, the Sixth Circuit has construed it to include registration
requirements as well, essentially because direct review of such regulations
would be sound policy. 195 That something ought to be the law does not
make it so; the statute should be amended to authorize direct review of
registration regulations.
The water statute contains a number of additional authorizations for
generally applicable regulations for which no judicial review provision is
189. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v.
EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973). Contra, Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.
1973).
190. CAA § l10(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970).
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (Supp. V 1975).
192. See text accompanying notes 55-68 supra (state permits).
193. However, § 301 also requires the discharger to meet any more stringent limitations
established under state law, whether or not necessary to meet the water quality standards.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c) (1970).
195. Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1976).
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made. Section 312, for example, authorizes regulations respecting the
discharge of domestic wastes from vessels; section 311 for defining
"hazardous substances," prescribing equipment to prevent their discharge,
determining what quantities of such materials are harmful, setting per unit
dollar amounts for discharge penalities, and establishing inspection stand-
ards; section 403 for defining "degradation" of the oceans; 196 section 404
for the deposit of dredged material; 97 and section 405 for the disposal of
sewage sludge. 98 All of these seem as susceptible to direct appellate review
as do those listed in section 509, and they ought to be included. 199
Section 312 of the FWPCA further authorizes states to ban all boat
sewage discharges upon the Administrator's finding that adequate facilities
for removal and treatment are reasonably available.200 Nothing is said
about either administrative procedure or judicial review, except that the
state is to file an "application" and the Administrator is to act within ninety
days. Even if no administrative hearing is held and the Administrator relies
on factual material outside the application-such as the Agency's own
inspection-it may be unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing upon
judicial review because of the arguably "legislative" nature of the facts in
issue. Thus, especially since related regulations under the same section
should be made reviewable directly in the courts of appeals, a plausible case
can be made for direct appellate review of the adequate facilities determi-
nation as well. There is an obvious analogy to approval of a state permit
program under section 402, which the courts of appeals may review.20 1
However, the absence of any record requirement-unless remedied by
EPA regulation-and the apparent utility of cross-examination of govern-
ment inspectors if relied upon to resolve narrow factual questions suggest
caution. At the least, provision should be made for remand if it proves
necessary to conduct a hearing. The Administrative Conference has re-
commended district court review of informal adjudications except for
actions that "typically involve issues of law or of broad social or economic
impact," even if a trial will be rare;202 while the action in question is
probably rulemaking, the fact that the determination may be no more
significant than whether there should be two pumpout stations rather than
one in a single harbor argues in any event against burdening the courts of
appeals with these cases. 205
196. FWPCA §§ 311-312, 403, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1343 (Supp. V 1975).
197. Id. § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
198. Id. § 405, 33 U.S.C. § 1345.
199. With regard to boat sewage and hazardous substances, vhich were considered by the
Committee on Judicial Review, the Conference has so recommended. ACUS Recommenda-
tions 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, E(1)(c), (d)).
200. FWPCA § 312(f)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
201. Id. §§ 402, 509(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1369(b).
202. ACUS Recommendations 1975, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No.
75-3, 6(b)(i)).
203. The Conference at EPA's suggestion has recommended direct appellate review.
ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4,
E(1)(d)).
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Finally, nothing is said of judicial review of approval or disapproval of
state permit programs for sludge disposal under the FWPCA section
405,204 or of determinations that specified areas are off limits for the
deposit of dredgings under section 404.205 The former is analogous to the
approval of state NPDES programs under section 402, which are made
reviewable in the courts of appeals; only the probable greater importance
of NPDES seems a reasonable justification for the distinction. Presumably
the classification of an area as off limits for dredgings is to be done by
regulation rather than by adjudication, since it is implicit that all potential
depositors would be affected. Nevertheless, since such a decision would
probably be of essentially local impact, a good case can be made for
retaining district court review.
III. THE CITIZEN-SUIT PROVISIONS
A. Undermining the Courts of Appeals
The plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus20 6 argued that the EPA
Administrator was required to disapprove state proposed implementation
plans that did not prohibit deterioration of areas cleaner than required by
air quality standards. The plaintiff in Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus20 7 argued
that the Administrator was required to issue an environmental impact
statement and hold an adjudicatory hearing before promulgating a plan
provision applying to the plaintiff's plant. Each of these cases was filed in a
federal district court, and each court accepted jurisdiction under section
304 of the CAA, which authorizes citizen suits to require the Administrator
to perform "any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary." The
district court in Sierra Club reasoned that if, as alleged, the CAA required
the Administrator to insist upon nondegradation clauses, his failure to do
so was a failure to perform a duty as to which the Act left him no discretion,
meeting the requirements of section 304.211
If the only section of the Act requiring construction in the Sierra Club
case had been section 304, something might have been said for such literal
interpretation, even though the terminology of the section is scarcely the
usual means of expressing a general principle of judicial review. But one
must not read section 304 in isolation. Since every nonconstitutional chal-
lenge to an implementation plan can be characterized as arguing that the
Administrator has failed to do what the statute requires, the reasoning of
the district court in Sierra Club means that every such attack upon approval
or promulgation of a plan may be brought in the district courts, although
section 307 expressly says it shall be brought "only" in the courts of appeals.
The only way to make sense of the statutory scheme is to hold, contrary to
204. FWPCA § 405, 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. V 1975).
205. Id. § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
206. 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C. 1972), affd mem., 4 ERC 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd by
an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
207. 352 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1973).
208. 344 F. Supp. at 254.
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Sierra Club, that section 307's explicit provision for exclusive appellate
court jurisdiction limits what otherwise might have been the jurisdiction of
the district courts under section 304.
209
The district court in Anaconda echoed the literalism of Sierra Club, but
it came up with an additional argument. The federal plan in Anaconda had
only been proposed, not adopted. Therefore, said the court, section 307
could not provide the exclusive remedy because it provided no remedy at
all: "[N]o present review is available to plaintiff under Section 307 of the
Act because there has been no promulgation of an implementation plan
.... ,"210 This argument was equally applicable to Sierra Club, where the
Administrator had not yet acted upon plans that the states had submitted.
That the federal standard in Anaconda could not have been reviewed
under section 307 before its adoption is almost certainly true. The courts
have generally held challenges to merely proposed regulations unripe,
211
and the Tenth Circuit has soundly held that section 307 applies only to
final EPA action. 212 Far from supporting the Anaconda argument that mere
proposal of a federal plan is reviewable in a district court, however, the
unavailability of review under section 307 compellingly argues to the con-
trary. The reason that merely proposed regulations or disapprovals of state
plans are not reviewable in the courts of appeals is that they are not
reviewable at all. Allowing pre-promulgation review in the district court
both contradicts the policy against resolving premature questions and
frustrates Congress' clear intent to avoid delay by routing questions regard-
ing the legality of implementation plans directly to the courts of appeals.21
3
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Tenth Circuit reversed in
Anaconda and ordered a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under section
304:
Congress has made clear in [section 307] . . that the courts of appeals
are to review the promulgation or implementation of a clean air plan
209. Accord, Luneburg & Roselle, Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, 15 B.C. INDUs. & Com. L. REV. 667, 691 n.145 (1974). The same result should be
reached under the FWPCA despite the absence from § 509 of the word "only"; district-court
review would contradict the policy of expeditious review evident in placing jurisdiction in the
courts of appeals.
210. 352 F. Supp. at 707.
211. E.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371,373 (D. Me. 1971); cf. Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-66 (1967) (holding unripe an attack on an adopted
regulation that the Court said had no immediate effect upon the plaintiffs).
212. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126, 127 (10th Cir. 1973).
213. If, as argued in Anaconda, there is a real danger of irreparable harm in waiting until
promulgation to seek review, that argument might be better directed to creating access to the
court of appeals under § 307 in order to respect the policy of direct review. However, one
presupposition of direct review is that there will be no need for a trial, which the appellate
court is ill-equipped to conduct, and the court can hardly base its decision on what was before
the Administrator if the latter has not completed his proceedings. This problem is of less
significance when, as is often the case in such proceedings, the issues are of law or of legislative
fact that may be debated in briefs without trial; and it may be that a claim of irreparable harm
prior to promulgation is always insufficient to overcome countervailing policies in light of the
possibility of staying the final regulation pending judicial review. In any event, § 304 should
not be used to circumvent the principle of direct review absent a most convincing showing that
immediate district court review is imperative.
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. .. A further reason for denying jurisdiction in this case is that the
cause was not ripe for injunctive relief. . . .Utah International, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency .... 214
Essentially the same considerations apply to the Sierra Club case.
21 5
In short, allegations that the Administrator has failed to take action
required by statute should not be permitted to circumvent the plain statu-
tory command that judicial review of decisions respecting implementation
plans and certain other regulations is to be in the courts of appeals, or the
plausible inference that review prior to final agency action is generally
premature. To hammer home a point that should already be obvious,
Congress might insert within the citizen-suit provisions an explicit excep-
tion for matters that are or will become reviewable in the courts of
appeals.2
16
B. Omissions from Adopted Regulations
The paradigm citizen suit, as indicated by the language of sections 304
and 505, is a horse of quite another color. A typical example is City of
Riverside v. EPA,217 in which it was argued and held that the Administrator
had failed to promulgate an implementation plan for Los Angeles within
the time limits prescribed by statute. 218 Such a case cannot be based on
materials on which the Administrator has passed, since he has done no-
thing; consequently there may have to be a trial, which would make direct
appellate review impracticable. Moreover, to wait until eventual promulga-
tion of the plan would utterly fail to protect the plaintiff's position. Thus, in
light of the provisions for review by courts of appeals, the citizen suit
should not be viewed as an avenue of judicial review of past or future
administrative action. Rather, it properly provides a remedy for the failure
of the Administrator to act at all.
Yet there will be cases in which, as observed by by one court of appeals,
"the line between action and inaction. . . disappears. 2 19 In National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA220 the Administrator had promulgated a
standard limiting the lead content of gasoline in order to protect catalytic
exhaust devices. The plaintiff argued he was required to adopt additional
standards to protect the public health from direct effects of automotive
lead emissions. On the one hand, as the court pointed out, NRDC's com-
plaint was that the regulation adopted did not go far enough; on the other,
it was that the EPA had failed to adopt any health-related regulation at all.
214. 482 F.2d 1301, 1304 (1973).
215. Tactical considerations such as the desirability of avoiding multiple litigation and the
availability of attorneys' fees may well influence a party's decision to seek review in a district
court. But the questions of fees and of centralized review are analytically separable from the
question of review in the district court or court of appeals; they should be dealt with on their
own merits, and should not be permitted to distort the present issue.
216. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No.
76-4, B(1)).
217. 4 ERG 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
218. Id. at 1731.
219. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
220. 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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The court concluded, with some misgivings, that the case had been proper-
ly brought under section 307, suggesting that the EPA had "discretion"
with respect to the adoption of health standards, but that the exercise of
that discretion in light of the available information was reviewable in the
court of appeals.
The suggestion that section 307 affords the appropriate remedy for
questions of factual arbitrariness seems to turn the apparent policy under-
lying the division of authority between courts of appeals and district courts
on its head, for if the sole task is application of the statutory language there
will be less likelihood of need for the trial that only the district court is
equipped to conduct. Moreover, the narrow scope of review suggested by
the court for section 304 risks making questions of abuse of discretion
totally unreviewable when the Administrator has done nothing at all. This
is not a necessary reading of the statutory limitation to duties that are "not
discretionary." Such a limitation has always confined the writ of man-
damus; yet the better view, confirmed by the Supreme Court, is that the
writ lies to determine whether an officer has acted beyond the scope of his
admitted discretion.2
2 1
A better approach would build upon the basis for district court juris-
diction under section 304: when there has been a rulemaking proceeding
and the petitioner is dissatisfied with the result, the court can weigh the
objection against the material that was before the Administrator, and the
proper forum is the court of appeals. When there has been no proceeding,
there is no administrative record and, consequently, greater likelihood of
need for a trial; therefore, the district court is the appropriate forum. This
distinction accords well with the common-sense meanings of sections 304
and 307, which provide, respectively, for failure to act and for review of
administrative action.
Thus, the court was right, albeit for different reasons, in ruling that
the omission of a health-related lead standard was a matter for the court of
appeals under section 307. The initial proposal had contained such a
provision, which was presumably the subject of comments during the
rulemaking proceeding; these comments would form a basis for judging
the legality of the Administrator's decision to drop the proposal. On the
other hand, if health standards had not been a subject of the proceeding,
section 304 would have provided the sole remedy.2
22
221. Work v. United States ex reL Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925); see W. GELLHORN & C.
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 151-53 (6th ed. 1974). There are still courts that refuse man-
damus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) for abuse of discretion. E.g., Ortego v. Weinberger, 516
F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975). The court in OIjato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515
F.2d 654, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1975), saying that § 304 was meant to reach only matters on which
there is no discretion at all, relied on the insertion of the words "not discretionary" in
conference and the committee's explanation that the provision had been "limited" to "manda-
tory functions." But the committee may simply have been concerned to make doubly certain
that the courts did not substitute their judgment for the Administrator's when he had acted
within the scope of his discretion. The court gave no reason why Congress might have wished
to preserve a distinction admittedly "abstract and conceptual." Id. at 662.
222. Cf. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975). The Seventh Circuit
held that a district court had no jurisdiction under § 304 to review the Administrator's
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C. Thl Failure to Revise Regulations
A further question of the interplay between sections 304 and 307 was
posed in Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train,223 a district court action
under section 304 to compel the Adminstrator to revise the new source
performance standards for coal-fired power plants.2 24 Rather surprisingly,
in view of the absence of a record and of the language of section 307, the
court held that section provided the sole avenue of redress. First, the court
drew once again on the distinction it had made concerning the scope of
review in NRDC v. EPA: section I I1's provision that the Administrator
"may" revise performance standards gives him discretion that takes the
matter outside section 304; abuse of that discretion is reviewable, if at all,
under the broader power of section 307. Moreover, the latter section was
intended "to provide a legal mechanism-and an exclusive one-to assure
that standards were revised whenever necessary." 225 Here the court quoted
the Senate Report to show that the provision allowing direct review more
than thirty days after promulgation of a standard "on grounds arising after
such 30th day" was meant to allow review of an abuse of discretion in
refusing to revise a standard on the basis of new information:
It is clear that new information will be developed and that such informa-
tion may dictate a revision or modification of any promulgated standard
or regulation established under the act. The judicial review section,
therefore, provides that any person may challenge any promulgated
standard, regulation, or approved or promulgated implementation plan
after the date of promulgation whenever it is alleged that significant new
information has become available.2 26
This is a most unexpected conclusion. The immediately attractive
answer to a section 304 complaint seeking a revision is simply that the
statutory term "may" imposes no duty to revise the standards and that
therefore, on the merits, the plaintiff has no cause of action. However, it is
decisions to make indirect source regulations inapplicable to sources whose construction was
commenced before January 1, 1975, over the objection that he had failed "to promulgate
regulations with respect to such facilities": "[A] provision defining the scope of regulations
and their effective date is as much a part of the regulations as the substantive parts." Id. at
689. The court dismissed, for failure to give the required notice, a § 304 claim that the
Administrator had unlawfully omitted several pollutants from the nondegradation regula-
tions and held that this claim could not be made under § 307, saying that the allegation was of
failure to act. Because the inclusion of these pollutants had been extensively considered in the
rulemaking proceeding, this latter ruling was in error. A significant prematurity problem, cf.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), was avoided because the
Administrator explicitly incorporated the nondeterioration rules into existing implementation
plans. Consequently, the District of Columbia Circuit has properly entertained under § 307
the argument that the Administrator erred in approving a plan not limiting degradation by
automotive pollutants. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
223. 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
224. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked that EPA require the use of flue gas desulfurization
devices even when low-sulfur coal was burned.
225. 515 F.2d at 660; accord, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975)
(dictum), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). As the court recognized in Oljato, this holding made it
unnecessary to decide whether, apart from the exclusivity provision, § 304 applied.
226. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1970).
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not easy to visualize how "grounds arising after" the review deadline can be
relevant to the validity of the original regulation unless, as the court held in
Qijato, the regulation must be revised as technology improves. However
awkward the phrasing, this is not such an implausible rendering of the
statutory language as to justify ignoring such a clear statement of legislative
intent. Thus I conclude the court was probably right in Qijato, but the
statute is in dire need of amendment; a judicial review provision ought not
be made to bear the weight of an implicit duty of revision that contradicts
the apparently plain words of another section of the same statute.
Given the court's decision that there is a duty to revise standards when
new information comes along, it seems peculiar that the statute places
review of the failure to do so in the court of appeals. There was no
substantial administrative record in Oljato on which to base review; as the
court recognized, it was faced with the prospect of developing the facts on
its own, a task for which a district court seems eminently better equipped.
One way out would have been to hold that the facts in question were
"legislative" and thus could be established through Brandeis briefs without
trial.2 27 The court found a different way, requiring under its "inherent
powers to enforce our interest in informed decision-making" that "any new
information thought to justify revision" be first presented to the Adminis-
trator as a prerequisite to review in the court of appeals.22 8
Assuming the court was correct about the duty to revise, this resolution
has much to recommend it in policy. Since the initial decision whether or
not to revise is the Administrator's, it makes sense that factual material
bearing on that decision be first presented to him rather than to either a
district court or court of appeals. The court can more properly be said to be
reviewing his decision under those circumstances than if it is asked to rule
that the Administrator should have revised the standard on the basis of
material that was not formally before him. But I see no warrant in the
statute for requiring proceedings before the Administrator on a request
for revision; if section 307 provides review of a failure to revise, it seems to
contemplate documentary establishment of the relevant legislative facts in
the court of appeals. I think the court has taken liberties with the statute in
order to achieve a more sensible scheme.
D. Mandamus in the Courts of Appeals
As the cases just discussed should indicate, the existence in each statute
of two distinct provisions for judicial scrutiny of the EPA in different
courts has already created considerable uncertainty and litigation over the
proper forum. Judge Wright is highly critical of the current state of the
law:
227. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 48-49.
228. Accord, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum), affd, 427 U.S.
246 (1976).
1252
HeinOnline  -- 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1252 1976-1977
ENVIRONMENTAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
[T]he courts have been of. .. little help to litigants attempting to discern
the parameters of Sections 304 and 307. While the courts play jurisdic-
tional badminton with these provisions, batting one case back to the
District Court under Section 304 while taking another identical one
under Section 307, litigants should not be denied substantial rights be-
cause of uncertainty created by courts and Congress.
229
The judicial and legislative reforms suggested above may alleviate, but
cannot completely avoid, this uncertainty. At best, the risk of finding
oneself in the wrong forum when it is too late to file in the right one seems
substantial enough to call for a transfer provision like that applicable to the
Court of Claims. 230 Uncertainty and threshold litigation would be reduced
further if the statute provided for appellate court determination (except in
enforcement cases) of all questions relating to regulations whose validity is
reviewable there. Furthermore, the courts of appeals, because of their
exclusive jurisdiction over final regulations, are likely to be more familiar
with the subject matter of these challenges than are the district courts.
Besides, since review of such a regulation adopted as a result of a court
order will be in the appellate court, district court jurisdiction over the
initial mandamus action effectively splits a single case between two
courts.
23 1
At first glance the cases properly brought in the district court under
the quasi-mandamus provisions belong there because of the absence of a
record; on reflection, however, this may be a largely theoretical problem.
Whether a standard must be promulgated will often depend solely upon
statutory construction, 232 and the ease of documenting the fact that no
standard has been adopted is likely to avoid the need for a hearing on the
facts. If the duty of the Administrator turns on such issues as whether a
substance is a dangr to public health, 23 3 the facts are likely to be "legisla-
tive" and thus susceptible to proof by Brandeis briefs without trial. While
policy may make it desirable, even though not necessary, to develop such
technical matters through oral testimony unsuitable for an appellate court,
the Oljato opinion seems correct, as a policy matter, in stating that the
229. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dissenting in part).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970):
If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts is filed in the Court of
Claims, the Court of Claims shall, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case
to any district court in which it could have been brought at the time such case is
filed, where the case shall proceed as if it had been filed in the district court on the
date it was filed in the Court of Claims.
See also ACUS Recommendations 1975, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No.
75-3, 8).
231. A question might even arise whether the proper avenue for review of such a regula-
tion is a contempt proceeding in the district court under some circumstances, which is
contrary to the statutory design.
232. See, e.g., NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (duty to adopt air quality
criteria for lead); NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (deadline for adopting
effluent guidelines under § 304 of the FWPCA).
233. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (lead standards for fuel); ef.
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (revision of new
source standard to reflect improved technology).
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delegation of authority to the Administrator to decide whether a standard
should be adopted or revised strongly suggests that the place to develop
factual materials, whether through trial or written submission, is before the
Agency itself.23 4 The language of the same court in assuming jurisdiction
over an order resulting from informal adjudication is singularly apt here:
"[T]he facts in issue lie peculiarly within the special competence of the
Secretary. The district court could do no more than remand to the Secre-
tary, as we do here. 235
On the basis of these considerations, the Administrative Conference
has recommended that the courts of appeals be given authority to resolve
preliminary questions respecting standards whose validity is reviewable in
the courts of appeals, and to deal with the Oljato problem by remanding
when necessary for an appropriate agency or district court proceeding.
23 5
IV. THE TIME LIMITS ON REVIEW
It is common for one charged with violating a regulation to argue in
defense that the regulation is invalid. Such a practice has considerable
potential for delay, for the upshot may be that the agency must start all
over on a new regulation after the time has come to meet the original. To
avoid this risk, Congress, which was in a great hurry to see the country
cleaned up, required that attacks on the validity of listed types of regula-
tions be made by petition in the court of appeals within thirty days (in the
case of air) or ninety days (in the case of water) after promulgation. To
make this point abundantly clear, the statutes add that action reviewable by
petition in the courts of appeals "shall not be subject to judicial review in
civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement." 23 7 A later review in the
234. Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d at 666-67.
235. EDF v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
236. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No.
76-4, B(2)). This recommendation appears to be consistent with the principles enunciated in
ACUS Recommendations 1975, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1976) (Recommendation No. 75-3, 6),
with respect to review of informal agency actions: The proceedings in question seem likely to
involve important issues that will often be taken in any event to the courts of appeals; the
issues seem likely in most cases to be resolvable without evidentiary trial; and the issues are
likely to be closely related to others already directly reviewable in the appellate courts.
The phrasing of the 1976 recommendation posed some difficulty. It could not very well
include "all questions relating to" such standards, since it was not intended to place enforce-
ment proceedings in the courts of appeals. Examples intended to be included are the failure to
promulgate a standard, the failure to revise it, and the refusal to postpone the date for
submission of an implementation plan for secondary air quality standards. The drafting is not
precise and may exclude other examples. Perhaps it would be best to refer all questions of
nondiscretionary duties respecting such standards to the courts of appeals.
If a hearing is necessary, I have argued that the agency is generally the best place to hold
it. This may not always be the case, however, as, for example, if the question is the adequacy of
the agency's excuse for failure to meet a statutory deadline. Thus, the allowance exists in the
recommendation for remand to a district court when an agency hearing would be
inappropriate.
237. FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. V 1975); CAA § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(b) (1970).
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court of appeals, however, is allowed if based "solely on grounds arising
after" the statutory period.2 3 8
A. Interpretation
The scope of these limitations on judicial review was at issue in Getty
Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus.2 39 A provision of Delaware's implementation plan
limited the use of high sulfur fuels in certain parts of the state after
January 1, 1972. Delmarva Power and Light Co., owner of the only plant
subject to the regulation, failed to comply by the prescribed date, and the
EPA issued an order directing it to comply by May 1, 1972. Getty, which
supplied high sulfur fuel to Delmarva in return for electricity, sued to have
the order set aside. The Administrator argued that the action was barred
by section 307 of the CAA because the issues could have been raised in an
attack upon the approval of the plan within thirty days after
promulgation.2
40
Getty raised four distinct grounds for attacking the EPA's order. The
Third Circuit held all four were cognizable by a section 307 petition and
were therefore barred. As to three of these grounds, the court was plainly
mistaken; as to the fourth, its holding was subject to serious doubts.
Getty's first argument was that the .National Environmental Policy
Act 4 1 required the Administrator to draw up an environmental impact
statement before issuing a compliance order.242 A contention that NEPA
required an impact statement in connection with the approval of the
implementation plan itself would clearly have been cognizable under,243
and hence barred by, section 307. Getty's position, however, was that a
statement was required not upon plan approval but upon issuance of the
later enforcement order. It seems abundantly clear that no such argument
would have been appropriate in a section 307 proceeding. Not only is that
section limited to challenges to the plan itself, but at the time when such a
review could have been sought there was no order to challenge.
Getty's next argument was that no federal compliance order should be
issued until final resolution of a pending state variance proceeding.2 44 This
argument too has nothing to do with the approval of the implementation
plan; it relates solely to the question of prerequisites for issuing a federal
order. It thus could not have been made under section 307 and cannot be
forbidden by that section.
238. Id. See text accompanying notes 223-28 supra for consideration of the meaning of the
new-grounds provision.
239. 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
240. Since Getty had taken the initiative by suing in advance of any effort at judicial
enforcement, technically its challenge could not be barred by the preclusion of judicial review
"in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement." Section 307, however, explicitly excludes
all untimely challenges by providing that review of the standards may be had "only" by filing a
timely petition in the court of appeals. The word "only" does not appear in the comparable §
509 of the FWPCA; yet exclusivity is plainly intended, for the policy of requiring early review
of regulations is infringed equally by a late challenge in any form.
241. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970).
242. Id. § 4332(2)(c).
243. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 504-07 (4th Cir. 1973).
244. 467 F.2d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 1972).
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Getty's third argument was that the compliance date set in the enforce-
ment order was not a "reasonable" one in light of the seriousness of the
violation and good faith efforts at compliance, 245 as required by section
113. 2' The government argued that, since an earlier compliance date had
been set by the implementation plan, the time to attack the date was during
a section 307 proceeding to review the regulation. 247 There is a certain
appeal to this position; to the extent that the EPA, in issuing the later
order, is bound by the date already set in the regulation, repetition of the
regulation date cannot obscure the fact that, in substance, the attack is on
the date set by the regulation. Getty, however, contended that the provision
of a reasonable time for compliance under section 113 was not merely a
formality, but a chance for a substantive second look on the basis of
individual hardship-in short, an informal variance provision. 248 Getty's
argument was thus quite distinct from that which could have been made
under section 307: while Getty could have argued in a section 307 petition
that the regulation time was too short, it could not have argued there that
the factors listed in section 113 required a variance from a valid regulation.
The district court, to its credit, resolved each of these first three issues
on the merits. 249 The court of appeals, without serious effort at explana-
tion, simply characterized the complaint as effectively attacking the validity
of the regulation.250
Finally, admitting that the only way to attack an implementation plan
on its face was under section 307, Getty nevertheless argued that section
307 did not authorize, and therefore did not forbid by later defense or suit,
an attack on the regulation as applied to an individual case. Both the
district court and the court of appeals rejected this distinction.25 ' The
statute certainly does not say it is limited to facial challenges; general
principles of separability and standing often mean that the normal attack
upon a statute or regulation is as applied rather than across the board, and
late challenges present the same problems of delay in achieving clean air
whether facial or as applied. 252
However, the considerations that make direct appellate review of
regulations practicable 253 are inapplicable when the attack is based upon
facts peculiar to the individual company. Suppose, for example, that a
company subject to a regulation conceded to be generally valid argues that
245. Id. at 355. See also 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1019 (D. Del. 1972).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970).
247. See 467 F.2d 349, 355-60 (3d Cir. 1972).
248. Id. at 358. See also 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (D. Del. 1972).
249. Cf. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), which held correctly
that a dispute over whether the plaintiff was in compliance with the applicable implementa-
tion plan was not barred by § 307. Id. at 316-17.
250. 467 F.2d 349, 355, 359 (3d Cir. 1972).
251. See id. at 355-56; 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (D. Del. 1972).
252. Cf. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921), which held that a
provision for appeal to the Supreme Court when state statutes were upheld by state courts
included cases in which a statute was attacked as applied. Id. at 288-89.
253. See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra.
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it cannot comply because there is no room to install the necessary controls
at its crowded plant, or that its financial condition is so precarious that it is
unreasonable to apply the regulation to it, or that the air is so clean in its
vicinity that compliance with a strict emission standard would be a waste of
money. These claims all depend upon facts that, in traditional terms, would
be considered adjudicative rather than legislative, and on which standard
learning would suggest there is a right to a trial-type hearing 25 4 that
appellate courts are ill-equipped to provide. Moreover, the rulemaking
record before the Administrator is likely to focus upon general questions
concerning the desirability of the regulation as a whole; it would be most
cumbersome to try every individual variance case during the course of the
rulemaking proceeding. Finally, even if there is a record of individual facts,
it will not be the result of the trial-type procedure that the Constitution
often requires for adjudicative facts, for the pollution statutes do not
provide for such a hearing in the adoption of regulations. There is no
provision in these statutes, as there is in the Hobbs Act,255 for transfer to a
district court for hearing. Furthermore, remand to the Agency for further
evidence is authorized only when the decision being reviewed is required
by statute to be based on the record of a trial-type hearing; this is not true
of any regulations relevant here.
The inadequacy of the rulemaking procedure for establishing ad-
judicative facts has led one court to hold, contrary to Getty, that attacks on
regulations as applied cannot be brought under or precluded by section
307.256 There is much to be said for this position. If possible, the statute
should be construed to avoid a result either unconstitutional or impracti-
cable. It is hard to believe Congress meant to require appellate courts to
conduct trials or to encumber rulemaking proceedings with innumerable
individual claims of individual hardship, and it made no provision for
separate quasi-judicial hearings. Moreover, the Senate Committee express-
ly said that a regulated person "would not be precluded from seeking such
review at the time of enforcement insofar as the subject matter applies to
him alone." 257 But the entire question of where to file an attack on a
regulation as applied may be based upon a misconception of the substan-
tive law. The very purpose of a regulation is to avoid the necessity for
determining the appropriate requirements on a case-by-case basis; that a
particular company may have special problems in meeting the standard will
most likely be held to be no excuse.258 This conclusion is made the more
254. See generally Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 379 (1908).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2347 (1970).
256. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 173 (6th Cir. 1973).
257. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970). Luneburg & Roselle, Judicial Review
Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 667-79 (1974), would
construe this remark to refer to attacks on enforcement orders, which necessarily apply only
to the complaining party. However, the antecedent for "such review" appears to be review of
"standards, rules and regulations." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1970).
258. See, e.g., Heinz v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 277,281 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945), which interpreted
a statute requiring maximum prices to be "generally fair and equitable": "[I]f the maximum
prices enabled most of the nonprocessing slaughterers to operate profitably, the regulation
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compelling under the federal air and water pollution statutes by the con-
spicuous absence of the broad variance provisions that are the common
means of excusing compliance with pollution laws on the basis of individual
hardship; to hold a regulation invalid as applied to individual facts would
effectively grant the variance that Congress has refused to authorize. 259
B. Constitutional and Policy Questions
A similar provision limiting the time for judicial review of regulations
under wartime price control legislation was upheld against due process
objections by the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States260 on the ground
that it afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the regulations "in
view of the urgency and exigencies of wartime price regulation,"261 which
were detailed at some length. In view of this decision it is not surprising
that the lower courts have so far upheld the time limits of the pollution
laws, without much discussion. 262
Yet the harshness of such a measure is manifest. Not everyone who will
ultimately be affected by a regulation will even find out about it as soon as it
is adopted, especially if, as one court has questionably held in reliance on
the literal terms of the statute, the time begins to run before publication of
the action in the Federal Register. 263 Some who do find out will not
immedately recognize that it affects them, or that it will be burdensome to
comply with, or that there are grounds for attacking it. The problem is
compounded by the fact that the impact of an air quality standard upon the
individual may be impossible to determine until after adoption of the plan
for its implementation, by which time the deadline will long since have
passed. Indeed the constitutional ripeness of an attack on an unim-
plemented air quality standard may be in doubt, since the standard does
not compel anyone to do anything and its ultimate impact is so uncertain.264
The statute even appears to make invalidity unavailable as a defense to
persons who went into the affected business, moved into the affected area,
or indeed were born after the thirty-day or ninety-day period. Perhaps
most serious, the statute places the burden of instituting litigation upon the
citizen, which is likely (and one suspects intended) to discourage litigation
over the validity of the regulations. To test the Yakus principle one may
hypothesize a statutory requirement that all constitutional challenges to
federal or state statutes must be made by instituting actions within thirty
would not be rendered invalid by the fact that an occasional marginal producer in the group
could not stay in business under the established ceilings." See also American Iron & Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
259. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 51-52.
260. 321 U.S. 414, 434-37 (1944).
261. Id. at 435.
262. Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940,943 (6th Cir. 1975); Granite City Steel Co. v.
EPA, 501 F.2d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1974); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 357-58
(3d Cir. 1972). In support of this conclusion see Luneburg & Roselle, Judicial Review Under the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 682-83 (1974).
263. Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1975).
264. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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days after their enactment. One suspects the Court might not be so happy
with a wholesale requirement of early review and would begin limiting
Yakus to extreme wartime emergencies, or to "merely" economic matters
such as prices.
Three remedies of increasing impact may be suggested. Most modest-
ly, thirty days appears to be a particularly short time in which to require the
decision to challenge a regulation; the Conference recommends that the
two statutes be made consistent at sixty days. 265 More significantly, I would
urge the courts, regardless of the time period chosen, to take care not to cut
off review in cases in which there was no reasonable prior opportunity for
judicial determination of the challenger's claim. Perhaps, to avoid the
constitutional question, they could accomplish this by a creative construc-
tion of the provision respecting grounds "arising" after the thirtieth or
ninetieth day, although the language is refractory and although the explicit
purpose of this provision was to require revision in light of changed
circumstances. 266 Perhaps it could be done, as one court has suggested, by
importation of general principles equitably tolling limitation statutes. 267
Alternatively, it should be held, as implied in Yakus, that to impose sanc-
tions upon one who has never had a fair opportunity to challenge the
regulation under which he is charged is to deprive him of property without
due process of law. 268 The statutes should be amended to make clear that
later attacks may be made by those with no opportunity to mount a timely
challenge.2 69
I would further recommend, in view of the likelihood that the early
review requirements may trap the unwary, that they be expeditiously
repealed. It seems unduly harsh, and out of line with modern views as
represented in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to deprive people of
substantial rights-perhaps to shut down a plant worth millions of dol-
lars--even for negligent failure to foresee the need to seek pre-
enforcement review. Abolition of the limits would also avoid time consum-
ing threshold litigation over whether the failure to seek timely review was
justifiable. Further, the time limits may actually increase the number of
challenges filed, since affected persons may feel impelled to sue to protect
against enforcement that may never take place. It seems significant that
Congress saw no need to forbid review at the enforcement stage in the
highly comparable areas of occupational safety and health270 and control of
265. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No.
76-4, D(2)). H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 305(c)(3) (1976), as passed by the House in
1976, would extend the air deadline to 60 days.
266. See text accompanying notes 223-28 supra.
267. Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
268. That the congressional authority over federal-court jurisdiction cannot be so exer-
cised as to deny constitutionally guaranteed rights I consider established by United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); accord, Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254,
257 (2d Cir. 1948). For further materials on this much-debated issue, see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL
COURTs 132-52 (2d ed. 1975).
269. The Conference is in agreement with this position. See ACUS Recommendations
1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, D(3)).
270. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970); see S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970).
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toxic substances, 271 and that after two years' experience the prohibition on
defending at the enforcement stage was abandoned even in the admittedly
extraordinary context of wartime price regulation.2 72 I see no comparable
emergency in the present pollution context; if in certain rare situations
involving highly toxic contaminants such an emergency may appear, a time
limit restricted to such emergency cases would serve the need. Accordingly
the Administrative Conference, over the EPA's opposition, has recom-
mended that the invalidity of a regulation be a permissible defense in an
enforcement proceeding.27
3
C. Augmeinting the Rulemaking Record
A related problem is presented by the provisions of H.R. 10498,274
passed by the House in 1976, which would limit the review of a court
reviewing an air pollution regulation to the record compiled in the Agen-
cy's rulemaking proceeding and generally to objections raised before the
Agency. The latter limitation, but not the former, would be inapplicable
upon a showing that it was "impracticable to raise such objection within
such time" or that the grounds for objection are new, if the objection is "of
central importance to the outcome of the rule." Commendably, in the event
the new objection may be made, it is to be made in the first instance before
the Agency. These amendments would further the sound policy that courts
should review what the EPA has done, not make initial determinations of
their own on matters within the experience of the Agency. Like the time
limits on judicial review, however, they may deprive the unwary litigant of
the opportunity to show that a regulation is invalid. The allowance for
making a late objection when a timely one was impracticable should prob-
ably be extended to additions to the record 275 to avoid penalizing those who
271. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 19(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. 2039 (1976)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2618).
272. Act of June 30, 1944, ch. 325, tit. II, § 107, 58 Stat. 639.
273. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No.
76-4, D(l)). Permitting review in enforcement proceedings would permit regulations to be
challenged in the district courts, and I have indicated my strong preference for review in the
courts of appeals, But the reason for the preference is the waste of time involved in requiring
a separate and unnecessary district court proceeding. When an enforcement action is filed,
there will generally be factual questions concerning the issue of violation that require district
court consideration in any event; for that court to determine the validity of the regulation at
the same time will not necessitate a separate proceeding.
Review at the enforcement stage would also permit decentralized review of regulations
now subject to exclusive review in the District of Columbia Circuit. As will appear below, I
would favor decentralized review of all regulations. The Conference, which did not, neverthe-
less evidently thought the policies favoring centralization should yield to the injustice of
preventing tardy review. If necessary the two policies could be reconciled, at some litigation
cost, by providing for certification of validity questions in enforcement cases to the D.C.
Circuit. Cf. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. V 1975); DeRieux v.
The Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
An improved variance procedure, which I would favor, would not avoid the time limit
problem. No administrative hearing is called for to resolve facial attacks on the regulations,
and if such a procedure were provided, my problem would remain: Should the challenger be
precluded from invoking it after the expiration of 30 (or 90) days?
274. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 305(a)(7)(A), (B) (1976).
275. See Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 19(b), 90 Stat. 2040
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have not even been negligent; the integrity of statutory restrictions on
rulemaking and the unfairness of denying a reasonable opportunity to
assert one's rights outweigh the need for expedition. The truly careless
litigant, however, may be in a somewhat less favorable position with regard
to the right to bring forward new objections or new factual material than
with regard to the right to seek delayed judicial review. For new matter,
properly handled, requires in every case a burdensome reopening of the
rulemaking proceeding, while tardy judicial review on the basis of what was
before the Agency does so only if the regulation is found to be invalid.
Moreover, the hardship to the potential litigant, while it may be substantial
in a particular case, will often be less severe when he is merely limited to
what was done before the Agency than when he is forbidden to sue at all.
On balance, I think it is probably desirable to exclude tardy objections and
factual material that could practicably have been presented in the rulemak-
ing proceeding. Without these limitations, either Agency expertise will be
circumvented or the rulemaking process will never be completed.276
V. WHICH COURT OF APPEALS?
A. Centralized Review of National Standards
Under the CAA, review of some administrative actions is had in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and review of others
in what is with something less than total clarity described as the "appro-
priate" circuit. The Senate Report was quite explicit about why the distinc-
tion was made:
Because many of these administrative actions are national in scope and
require even and consistent national application, the provision specifies
that any review of such actions shall be in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. For review of the approval or
promulgation of implementation plans which run only to one air quality
control region, the section places jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Circuit in which the affected air quality control region, or portion
thereof, is located.277
Thus the principle is clear: matters of local significance are to be
reviewed locally, while matters on which national uniformity is desirable
are to be reviewed only in the District of Columbia. A glance at the matters
the committee placed on each side of this line suggests a basic rationality to
the division. Implementation plans are submitted by individual states and
(1976) ("reasonable grounds for ... failure to make such submissions and presentations in
the proceeding before the Administrator").
276. A proposed recommendation to this effect was deleted by the Committee on Judicial
Review, not on the merits, but because it was thought to relate to the procedures for raising
late objections rather than to judicial review. Efforts on the Conference floor to require that
materials or objections brought forward for the first time in enforcement proceedings be first
passed on by the agency were defeated, though no one spoke in opposition. The Oljato
decision, see text accompanying notes 223-28 supra, suggests the courts will find ways of
accomplishing this goal without specific authorization.
277. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970). The bill as it then stood, like the final
act, employed the term "appropriate" circuit. See id. at 125.
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may differ from state to state; the statute in authorizing such diversity has
subordinated any interest in uniformity. On the other hand, national
ambient air quality standards set at levels necessary to protect the public
health and welfare278 and national emission standards set according to
available or practicable technology279 are likely to be nationally uniform.
Thus the lone timely petition to date attacking an ambient air quality
standard was filed in the District of Columbia Circuit,280 and challenges to
allegedly too stringent provisions in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia
implementation plans approved by the EPA were filed in the Fourth
Circuit, which includes those states.
281
The FWPCA, in contrast, makes no provision for centralized review of
regulations of nationwide impact. Even nationally applicable performance
standards for new sources, for example, are reviewable under that Act in
the circuit in which the petitioner "resides or transacts such business. '282
There is no apparent reason why centralized review is more appropriate
for such cases when the polluted medium is air than when it is water; the
statutes are simply inconsistent. It would seem appropriate for Congress to
decide one way or the other. My own preference, as I have indicated
elsewhere, 283 is against vesting exclusive jurisdiction in a single reviewing
court. While centralization facilitates the development of expertise and
speeds final resolution of issues without the necessity for Supreme Court
intervention, it also deprives us of the benefit of diverse views on difficult
legal questions, gives enormous power to a single inferior tribunal, incon-
veniences distant litigants to some degree, and creates undesirable pres-
sures on the process of appointing judges.284
B. The "Appropriate" Circuit
Not every case fits the pattern envisioned by the Senate Committee.
Arguably, for example, an especially stringent air quality standard could be
set to protect a particular national park. 285 Similarly, in response to a
278. CAA § 109(b)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1), (2) (1970).
279. Id. § IIl(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a)(1).
280. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
281. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 499 (4th Cir. 1973).
282. FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
283. See generally Currie & Goodman, supra note 95.
284. The Conference, by a divided vote, recommends centralized review of national
standards under both statutes. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976)
(Recommendation No. 76-4, A(l)). The pointed language of the Supreme Court in resolving
an inter-circuit conflict over the power of the EPA to prescribe effluent limitations by
regulation, suggests that the Court itself may favor decentralized review:
This case exemplifies the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full
consideration by the courts of appeals. By eliminating the many subsidiary, but still
troubling, arguments raised by industry, these courts have vastly simplified our task,
as well as having underscored the reasonableness of the agency view.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965, 978 n.26 (1977).
285. An appropriate example is found in the express provision of the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act, wherein substantive regulations "may make different provisions as re-
quired by circumstances for different contaminant sources and for different geographical
areas." ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 1111/2, § 1027(a) (1976). This authority-to tailor the rule to the
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request for postponement the Administrator promulgated 1975 vehicle
emission standards that were more stringent for California than for the
rest of the nation.286 Conversely, that not every question respecting an
implementation plan is of purely local significance has already spawned
court decisions raising serious issues not only of statutory policy but of
statutory construction as well.
On May 31, 1972, the Administrator announced his decision regard-
ing the approval or disapproval of a number of state implementation
plans. 287 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the
Administrator's action on several grounds: that he had unlawfully ex-
tended the statutorily prescribed time288 for filing plans to achieve com-
pliance with the primary air quality standards; that in extending the date
for compliance with those standards he had failed to follow prescribed
statutory procedures; 289 and that he had approved plans that did not
contain adequate measures to assure that future growth would not cause
violations of the air quality standards.290
Since NRDC was attacking the Administrator's "action in approving or
promulgating any implementation plan," section 307 tells us review should
be sought in the "appropriate" circuit; and the Senate Report, quoted
above, suggests that "appropriate" is shorthand for "the Circuit in which
the affected air quality control region. . . is located." This analysis would
mean that, since many state plans were being attacked on identical
grounds, review would have had to be sought in eleven courts at once. To
protect itself,291 NRDC filed all eleven petitions, but to avoid multiple
litigation it asked that all cases be transferred to the District of Columbia
Circuit, which it alleged to be the "appropriate" circuit under section 307
because the Administrator, in taking the challenged actions, had "articu-
lated the administrative policy positions which were applied nationally and
uniformly." 29
2
Five courts of appeals accepted this argument and transferred the
cases; the other five stayed proceedings pending the outcome in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.293 Only the First Circuit wrote an opinion, and it ap-
proved the transfer,294 concluding that "appropriate" was not a synonym
need-should be held implicit in the federal statutes, since no intention appears to require
EPA to ignore distinctions relevant to statutory standards. See Currie, Federal Air-Quality
Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 365, 368-69.
Especially stringent water-quality standards for high-quality recreational waters are common
at the state level. E.g., Ill. PCB Regs., ch. 3, Rule 206 (Lake Michigan).
286. See 38 Fed. Reg. 10,317, 10,318 (1973).
287. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (1972).
288. CAA § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
289. Id., § 1I0(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970).
290. Id., § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B).
291. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970), requires challenges to EPA
approval of implementation plans to filed within 30 days.
292. See NRDC v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 493 (1st Cir. 1972) (quoting from the petitioners'
brief).
293. See 3 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10,013 (1973).
294. NRDC v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492 (1972).
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for "local." First, said the court, when Congress intended to require local
review under the Clean Air Act it specifically said so: the same statute
provides for review of a decision postponing the date for individual com-
pliance with a state implementation plan in the court of appeals "for the
circuit which includes such State." 295 Nor, the court said, did the Senate
Report require a contrary conclusion:
The Senate Report implies a Congressional concern for a geographic
approach to review only where particularistic attention is given to each
plan devised for one air quality control region, and not where the auto-
matic application of standard, nation-wide guidelines to all plans simulta-
neously preordains wholesale approvals or extensions.
296
Having thus interpreted "appropriate" to allow a "flexible approach"
to determining the most suitable forum on the facts of the case, the First
Circuit then held that the issue should be decided in a single proceeding in
the District of Columbia:
Whatever words are used to describe the Administrator's actions on
the three issues presented, we fail to understand how his rationale relates
specifically to each individual state plan. The legal issues raised by
petitioners in the First Circuit seem to be identical with those raised in
every other circuit. The parties are the same. There do not appear to be
factual questions unique to each circuit. We must also consider that
litigation in several circuits, with possible inconsistent and delayed results
on the merits, can only serve to frustrate the strong Congressional inter-
est in improving the environment as evidenced by the Clean Air Act.
Additionally, we do not feel that judicial manpower is so abundant so as
to permit several circuits to solve identical complex legal and factual
issues in the present case. We note that petitioners first filed in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That is
where the Environmental Protection Agency has its headquarters. That is
where the appropriate files are kept and where the regulations are an-
nounced. In light of all these factors we are led to conclude that the D.C.
Circuit is "the appropriate circuit" to hear petitioner's claims. 297
Transfer, the First Circuit then held, was authorized if not required by 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a), which mandates transfer to the court in which the first
proceeding was filed when "proceedings have been instituted in two or
more courts of appeals iyith respect to the same [administrative] order."298
295. CAA § I 10(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(2)(B) (1970).
296. 465 F.2d at 494.
297. Id. at 495.
298. It is not altogether clear that the First Circuit's decision that the District of Columbia
was the "appropriate" forum to entertain an attack upon all implementation plan approvals
was a requisite to transfer under § 2112(a). The court opined that any requirement that the
transferee court be one in which the petition was properly filed "might be thought of as"
satisfied by the holding that the District was the "appropriate" forum. It also expressed
"doubts," however, that there was any such requirement: Since the first petition had been filed
in the D.C. Circuit, "we are granted express authority to transfer this case to the D.C.
Circuit"-apparently even if venue was improper there. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354
F.2d 507, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1965), so holds. Yet, though the statute, unlike the district court
transfer provision in 28 U'S.C. § 1404(a) (1970), contains no express limitation requiring
transfer to a court in which the proceeding "might have been brought," see Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335 (1960), Congress could scarcely have intended to frustrate applicable venue
limitations by permitting a litigant to bootstrap himself into an inappropriate forum simply by
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The District of Columbia Circuit, accepting jurisdiction of the entire
case, agreed with the reasoning of the First Circuit and added that requir-
ing review in the circuit including the state whose plan is attacked would
have further "anomalous" results:
The Administrator has informed us that implementation plans in several
metropolitan areas cover jurisdictions falling within several circuits. In
our own metropolitan area of the District of Columbia and the surround-
ing Virginia and Maryland suburbs, for example, adoption of the Ad-
ministrator's narrow interpretation of the statute would require review of
the Administrator's approval of the D.C. metropolitan area implementa-
tion plans to take place in both our own court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. We doubt that Congress intended such a result,
especially in light of the indication elsewhere in the Act of a strong
congressional concern for coordinated decision-making with respect to
metropolitan areas crossing over several jurisdictions.299
filing there first and then requesting transfer from a proper forum in which an identical
petition is later filed. Surely the question 01hether the first petition was properly filed must be
open after transfer in such a case; if it is, no useful purpose would be served by transferring
other petitions there only to be dismissed along with the one erroneously filed.
A less radical interpretation of § 2112(a) might also sustain transfer without a determina-
tion that the transferee circuit has jurisdiction with respect to every state's plan that is under
attack. The transfer section requires only that proceedings be instituted in two or more courts
with respect to "the same order." It might therefore suffice, even if the transferee forum must
have jurisdiction, that it have jurisdiction over some portion of the order; and the jurisdiction
of the D.C. Circuit over the Administrator's order insofar as it affected the District of
Columbia was clear. This argument, however, would require transfer if one petition attacked
a provision based upon considerations peculiar to California and another one peculiar to
Connecticut, while forbidding transfer if the Administrator had chosen to enunciate parallel
actions respecting several states in more than one formally titled "order." It might be prefer-
able, when a single order disposes of a variety of disparate matters, to determine the meaning
of "order" on the admittedly uncertain basis of litigation convenience in the particular case.
A further problem with transfer concerns whether or not regulations are "orders" within
§ 2112. The APA excludes them from its definition of "orders," 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970), and
some courts have held them outside provisions for direct review of administrative "orders" in
the courts of appeals. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at 39-41. It is highly probable
that what Congress had in mind in the transfer statute were adjudicative orders; the statute
and its history are permeated with references to the "record," see S. REP. No. 2129, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), which is a concept only recently given content as to rulemaking
decisions not required to be based on the record. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 95, at
43-48. The potential multiplicity of parties and of issues may make the appropriateness of
mandatory transfer and consolidation less clear when general regulations are to be reviewed.
The First Circuit's holding that the District of Columbia Circuit was the appropriate one
in NRDC may have meant that venue was improper in the transferor court; and a later
decision has held § 2112 inapplicable in such an instance, Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA,
520 F.2d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 1975), without giving reasons. Contra, NLRB v. Bayside Enter-
prises, Inc,, 514 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975). Neither the language nor the purpose of § 2112,
however, appears to make this fact decisive, though a comparable district-court provision was
apparently thought insufficient to provide for transfer from an improper forum. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406 (1970). Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), lends some support
to a broad reading here, for it held that § 1406, which expressly dispenses with the need for
proper venue, implicitly makes personal jurisdiction unnecessary as well.
Finally, several courts have found an "inherent" power in the courts of appeals to transfer
cases, even from a forum in which venue is improper, for example, Dayton Power & Light Co.
v. EPA, 520 F.2d at 708; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 782, 783 (5th Cir. 1975), but
only to a court in which the case could properly have been filed, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
299. NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 969, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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More recently the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion when the
nondegradation regulations affecting all state plans were challenged in
several circuits at once.
300
On the facts of these cases it would certainly have been wasteful to
have had eleven review proceedings instead of one; and the issues were
certainly of national significance. However, the flexible interpretation of
the term "appropriate circuit" adopted in the NRDC opinions requires the
courts to decide in each case what is the most suitable forum. This in turn
may result in a good deal of threshold litigation, precisely the kind of
litigation that venue statutes are intended to avoid. Such statutes make
rough determinations as to the suitable forum in broad categories of cases,
on the basis that a perfect allocation of individual cases to the best court is
not worth the cost in litigating over what is, after all, an ancillary question.
In their desire to achieve a sensible resolution of the particular case, the
NRDC opinions appear to leave us essentially without a venue statute for
determining where to challenge action with respect to the approval of
implementation plans.
The problem of uncertainty would be reduced if we could construe the
NRDC opinions to hold that questions of national import must be decided
in the District of Columbia, while others are to be decided locally. However,
they enunciate no such simple test. The First Circuit stressed the "flexible"
nature of the venue provision, the fact that the parties to all eleven cases
were identical, and the fact that the first petition had been filed in the
District of Columbia; the transferee court implied that a single forum
would be appropriate f6r all questions about implementation plans cover-
ing a single metropolitan region. Which forum to choose in the latter
situation, 30 1 or what to do if the parties differ302 or if there is no petition in
the D.C. Circuit, is by no means clear. Other courts, moreover, have paid
no heed to any distinction between local and national issues; without
referring to the NRDC venue cases, five courts of appeals have entertained
identical arguments that state variance provisions are illegal,303 five that the
statute requires consideration of the cost of compliance, 304 and four that
300. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703 (1975). The opinion adds nothing to
the reasoning of the earlier cases except to note that the regulations in issue had been adopted
pursuant to an order of the District of Columbia courts. However, while the Sierra Club was a
party in both the Sixth and the D.C. Circuits, the parties in the two forums were not otherwise
identical; the decision therefore may reflect a further step toward consolidating all "national"
issues in the District of Columbia.
301. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971,979 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975), noting the
transfer of Fourth Circuit petitions affecting the National Capital Air Quality Control Region
to the D.C. Circuit without giving reasons for the choice.
302. In District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petitions were filed by
different parties in two circuits, and transfer was ordered without discussion. Id. at 979 n.6.
See Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703, 705-06 (6th Cir. 1975).
303. All five were styled NRDCv. EPA: 507 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1974); 494 F.2d 519,
522 (2d Cir. 1974); 489 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1973); 483 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1973); 478
F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1973). Three conflicting positions were taken, and the issue was
resolved in Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
304. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743, 747-48 (3d Cir. 1975); Buckeye Power,
Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495,
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the states may not be ordered to engage in regulatory activities. 30 5
In any case, referring all issues of national importance to a single
circuit would not put an end to definitional problems. What would happen,
for example, if a federal position on the general availability of technology
to control gold mine emissions turned out to have practical application only
to three circuits in which gold mines exist? But there is a more serious
problem with such a test: one arguing that a particular measure is unneces-
sary to meet ambient standards in Des Moines and that the EPA must reject
unnecessarily strict measures would apparently have to file in two courts at
the same time.
There is another possible reading of the "appropriate circuit" that
would take account of the failure to provide explicitly for local review while
avoiding some of the uncertainty of the NRDC approach: that Congress
intended to leave the question to be resolved according to general venue
statutes. Such a course would be entirely sensible if review were in the
district courts, for the Judicial Code contains explicit provisions specifying
district court venue. 3 6 That there is no general venue statute for the courts
of appeals,30 7 however, makes the inference seem unlikely. If Congress in
prescribing the "appropriate" circuit meant to incorporate district court
venue provisions by analogy, those most nearly in point allow civil actions
against federal agencies or officers to be brought where the plaintiff or
defendant resides-which may be wherever it does business, if it is a
corporation- 08 -or where the cause of action arose, which common sense
would say, if metaphysics allows, is where the plan is to take effect.30 9 Some
uncertainty in choice of analogy is provoked by dissimilar provisions for
Tucker Act or tort actions against the United States itself.3
10
498-99 (4th Cir. 1973) (all holding costs relevant). Contra, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d
206, 215-16 (8th Cir. 1975); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 843 (7th Cir.
1975).
305. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding they may). Contra,
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 225 (4th
Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971,986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1975). On the other
hand, petitions in several circuits attacking indirect-source provisions incorporated in various
state plans have been transferred to the District of Columbia Circuit, presumably because such
provisions were adopted in response to that court's decision in the NRDC case. NRDC v. EPA,
475 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,689 (7th Cir.
1975).
306. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
307. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that petitions to review adminis-
trative orders shall be filed in "a court of appeals which is authorized to review such order."
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Similarly, the APA speaks of review in "a court of competent jursidic-
tion," 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). Venue is commonly but variously prescribed in statutes setting
up each agency. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (Trade Commission orders in circuit where act
occurred or plaintiff resides or does business); 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970) (FCC license denials
in District of Columbia Circuit).
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). There are, however, questions both as to whether this
provision applies to corporate plaintiffs and as to whether it should be read into venue
provisions pertaining to suits against the United States or its officers. Id. § 1391(e). See text
accompanying notes 315-20 infra.
309. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970).
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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Thus there are at least four plausible interpretations of the statutory
term "appropriate" circuit, each with its own drawbacks. To require an ad
hoc determination of the most appropriate forum in the individual case, as
apparently held in the NRDC cases, invites wasteful threshold litigation.
To refer all issues of "national" concern to the District of Columbia Circuit
would create some uncertainty and would require many cases to be split in
two. To hold analogous venue statutes incorporated in section 307 would
also generate uncertainty, would allow forum shopping, and would be hard
to reconcile with the statute's apparently singular reference to "the" appro-
priate forum. To read "appropriate" as a euphemism for "local," while it
accords best both with the explicit intention of the Senate Committee and
with the juxtaposition of the D.C. Circuit as the forum for reviewing
national standards, would have required the waste of eleven identical
proceedings in NRDC.
The lessons to be drawn from this analysis are three. First, as a matter
of statutory construction, the NRDC opinions are a classic example of hard
cases and bad law. The Senate Committee's unmistakable statement of
intention would have been followed if legislative history is ever to have a
place in interpretation, as it is a perfectly plausible rendering of the statu-
tory language. Second, the statute itself is intolerably vague; it lends itself
to useless threshold litigation over four conflicting interpretations. Third,
the only judicial interpretation of the statute to date is itself unacceptably
uncertain, promising additional litigation over its application.
A bill recently passed by the House would provide for exclusive Dis-
trict of Columbia review of implementation-plan approval "if such action is
based on" a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if the Adminis-
trator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determina-
tion."311 This proposal would leave intact in the absence of such a finding
the vague reference to the "appropriate" circuit, which may yet spawn
additional litigation-for example, when an issue is not national but is
common to portions of a control region extending beyond a single circuit.
Moreover, it would require a District of Columbia forum for all national
issues whether or not there are challenges to more than one state's plan,
whether or not the parties are identical, and whether or not local issues are
also present, although the result in some cases may be either to split a single
case in two or to burden the D.C. Circuit with issues local to another circuit.
It is left unclear whether pendent local issues are to be separated out or
litigated in the district, or whether the court may decide this question
according to the facts of each case. In an effort to reduce litigation over
what is a "national" issue, the bill would give the EPA, an interested party,
effective power to select a favorable forum. To the extent judicial review of
the EPA's certification is to be allowed-and the bill leaves this question up
in the air-uncertainty and undesirable threshold litigation would reap-
pear. If such a provision is enacted, it should at least make clear that issues
that are not national in scope are to be reviewed in the circuit containing
311. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 305(c)(4) (1976).
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the state whose plan is at issue, that the EPA's certification is not review-
able, and that the D.C. Circuit has discretion to transfer pendent local
questions. My general belief in the desirability of divergent views on ques-
tions of national import, 1 2 however, leads me to recommend codification
of the Senate Committee position that all questions respecting implementa-
tion plans are reviewable in the circuit containing the state whose plan is
challenged, 13 relying on the transfer power to alleviate undue multiplicity
of litigation in extreme cases such as NRDC. 14
C. The Vague Test of the FWPCA
The Administrative Conference advocates exclusive D.C. Circuit re-
view of national standards under the FWPCA. Even if this view becomes
law, however, there will remain EPA actions subject to local review in local
courts of appeals, such as the grant or denial of permits, action on state
permit programs, and water quality related standards for individual bodies
of water under section 302.315 The present provision for venue in the
circuit where the petitioner "resides or transacts such business," whether or
not its applicability is later limited to local determinations, is subject to
serious objections.
First, with respect to corporations, the reference to the circuit where
the petitioner "resides" is ambiguous. Arguably it incorporates the defini-
tion of the general venue statute,31 6 namely, that a corporation "resides"
wherever it does business. If so it seems undesirably broad, for California
312. See text accompanying notes 284-85 supra.
313. To add the District of Columbia Circuit at the petitioner's option, as in many
administrative review statutes, would afford a safety valve against wasteful multiple litigation
as in NRDC without inconveniencing the government, but at the cost of forum-shopping and
of further burdening that busy court and requiring it to decide many issues of purely local
concern.
314. Cf. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035 (3d Cir. 1975), in which
transfer was used to consolidate related challenges against nationwide effluent limitations
under the FWPCA's provision for decentralized review. Although the transfer route requires
the apparently wasteful step of initial multiple filings, it has the intangible advantage, as
compared with a flexible test for the "appropriate" initial forum, of implying that local review
is the norm, to be departed from only upon a special showing; it is conceivable that this
difference in emphasis may discourage unnecessary litigation. Moreover, the considerable
discretion embodied in the principle of transfer is a substantial safeguard against potential
reversal on venue grounds in the Supreme Court. In light of the ambiguity of existing transfer
powers, see note 298 supra, the Administrative Conference recommends an amendment "to
remove doubts about the authority of any court of appeals to transfer such cases to any other
court of appeals to avoid undue duplication, or in the interests of justice." ACUS Recommen-
dations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, A(4)).
The Conference, while favoring centralized review for nationwide regulations, has
adopted the Senate Committee position. Id. A(3). The costs of attempting to centralize
review of national questions in implementation plans are too high.
315. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. V 1975). ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-3, E), would add to this list the approval of state
water quality standards and of state proposals to ban the discharge of marine sewage.
In all these cases, as with implementation plans, questions of national import may well
arise. As in the case of implementation plans, however, the Conference was unimpressed by
EPA's request for centralized review of such issues.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
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hardly seems the right place to argue a case involving a Pennsylvania
factory just because the company also does business there. But the general
definition has not been read into every special venue statute,317 and corpo-
rations have been held under the patent venue statute to "reside" only
where incorporated. 318 Moreover, it is not even clear whether or not the
general definition applies to corporate plaintiffs as well as to defendants, 19
or whether it incorporates the untidy law of "doing business" that governed
personal jurisdiction before the enactment of long-arm statutes. Further-
more, even a narrower definition of residence would hardly point to the
most appropriate forum, since the place of incorporation or principal place
of business-the latter itself an elusive and litigation-provoking con-
cept 2°--may be far from the plant whose discharge is at stake.
Ambiguity is compounded by the FWPCA's unfortunate provision for
venue where the petitioner "transacts such business." There is no antece-
dent for "such," so it is unclear whether the requisite fact is the transaction
of business affected by the challenged regulation or the transaction of any
business at all. The latter reading would appear unjustifiably broad, since
convenience and familiarity with local conditions dictate a forum with some
connection with the controversy. Even the more restricted meaning can be
unduly stretched, as when one court concluded that business transacted at
company headquarters in Missouri would be affected by Colorado's permit
program. 2' The court sidestepped the question of corporate residence and
expressly refused to resolve the ambiguity respecting transaction of busi-
ness, for it found both tests satisfied, while quoting the Conference Com-
mittee's paraphrase of the statute as allowing venue where the petitioner
"resides or transacts business." The court did largely redeem the situation
by transferring the case to the Tenth Circuit, but it would avoid a situation
of musical chairs if the courts held, and the statute provided, that venue lay
in Colorado in the first place.
Drafting the appropriate venue provision, however, is not so easy as it
might appear. The Administrative Conference position on national stan-
dards somewhat simplifies the task, for most of the actions remaining
subject to local review apply only to a single state (for example, permit
program approval) or to a single facility (permit issuance or denial). The
Conference thus recommends that such determinations be reviewed "in
the circuit containing the state or facility." 322 For simplicity's sake the
recommendation is silent as to section 302 standards, which may affect a
body of water (such as Lake Superior) in more than one circuit. Such
317, See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957) (patent case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)).
318. Id. at 226.
319. Compare Southern Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649, 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), with Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83,85 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
320. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
321. Peabody Coal Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1975).
322. ACUS Recommendations 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No.
76-4, A(2)).
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standards should be reviewable in one of those circuits, preferably that in
which the petitioner is affected by the challenged action.
The drafting problem becomes more acute if the present principle of
local review for national standards is retained or extended to the CAA.
When a person subject to the requirement challenges such a standard, it
would make sense to channel review to a circuit in which he makes the
affected discharge or conducts the affected business. When the petitioner
is a consumer of air or water arguing that a national standard is too lax,
analogy suggests review should take place where he is affected by the action
of which he complains. While such a test would no doubt lead to some
litigation, it is a somewhat more precise variant of the familiar reference to
the place where the cause of action arose; it would probably be the best
single standard if local review were to be provided for all actions reviewable
in the courts of appeals.
VI. STANDING
Section 304 of the CAA allows a suit by "any person";323 section 505 of
the FWPCA by a person "having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected";3 24 section 509 of the same Act by "any interested person";3 25 and
section 307 of the CAA is silent on the question of standing.3 26 The
existence of these four conflicting provisions for various types of judicial
review makes for both uncertainty and inconsistency in the administration
of the laws.
A. Interpretation
1. "Any Person"
"Any person" may sue to compel the Administrator to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under section 304 of the CAA. It is difficult to
construe this language not to confer standing on everyone; the First Circuit
has described it as a provision for "universal" standing. 27 The legislative
history contains nothing to cast doubt on this interpretation. The Senate
Report stressed the need for citizen suits to make up for possible govern-
ment laxity and observed that persons suing under section 304 "would be
performing a public service";3 28 nothing was said about any limitation on
who might bring suit.3 29
323. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Supp. V 1975).
325. Id. § 1369.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970).
327. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (lst Cir. 1973) (dictum).
328. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970).
329. Id. at 36-39. One court, however, has without explanation stated that § 304 does not
dispense with the necessity for demonstrating "a sufficient interest in the specific controversy
as to meet traditonal concepts of standing." Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 6
ERC 1363, 1365 (D.D.C. 1974) (dictum), citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Finding a sufficient allegation of injury, the court upheld standing.
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2. "An Interest ... Adversely Affected"
The original Senate version of the comparable citizen-suit provision of
the FWPCA would similarly have conferred universal standing.3 0 A House
amendment would have limited standing to persons "affected" and to
groups whose participation in the administrative process had shown "a
special interest in the geographic area in controversy. '33 ' Thereafter, in
Sierra Club v. Morton,332 the Supreme Court held that only a person injured
had standing to challenge governmental action under the APA, which
provides for review at the instance of a "person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute."33 3 The Conference Com-
mittee, leaving intact the sentence allowing suit by "any citizen," thereupon
defined "citizen" for purposes of section 505 as "a person having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected. ' 34 This language, the
Conference Report explains, "reflects the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Sierra Club v. Morton. 33
5
It seems odd that the committee felt compelled, in drafting a statutory
standing provision, to incorporate the test the Court had employed in
construing another statute. Moreover, there may be no little confusion in
administering the standing requirement of section 505. The language
chosen-"an interest. . . adversely affected"-is neither that of Sierra Club
nor of the statute that opinion construed. All Sierra Club holds is that one
who does not allege injury may not sue; Congress could have adopted that
requirement by conferring standing on anyone "adversely affected." The
ambiguous additional requirement of an "interest" may be merely redun-
dant, or it may suggest that something beyond simple injury is required.
The APA, on the other hand, has been authoritatively construed to require
not only injury but also that "the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."3 36 Since
this language was quoted with evident approval in dictum in the Sierra Club
opinion, it is arguable that the Conference Committee meant by its use of
the word "interest" to incorporate the full standing requirements of the
APA. Again, however, less ambiguous terms were at hand to accomplish
this goal; the bare word "interest" does not immediately suggest a determi-
nation of the class protected by the provision sought to be enforced, and a
paraphrase of the zone test or a reference to the APA would have made
matters perfectly plain. Indeed, the most natural reading of the naked
330. See H.R. REP. No. 1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1972).
331. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1972).
332. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
333. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
334. H.R. REP. No. 1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1972).
335. Id.
336. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
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words of section 505 would suggest a reincarnation of the old requirement,
specifically discredited by the Supreme Court in construing the APA, that
the plaintiff have a "legally protected interest. '337 Such an interpretation,
however, as well as any fourth possible meaning of "interest" that departs
from the Sierra Club or APA tests, would be clearly contrary to the explicit
intention of the Conference Committee to "reflect" the Sierra Club
decision.338
My inclination would be to hold that "interest. . . adversely affected"
is a long-winded way of saying "adversely affected." The most probable
explanation of the Conference Committee's behavior is that it detected in
Sierra Club intimations of constitutional limitations on standing, although
the case explicitly turned on statutory construction, and the court in foot-
note dictum appeared to disclaim the existence of any constitutional limita-
tion.3 139 If the standing requirement was inserted out of perceived constitu-
tional compulsion, it should be read to require only injury in fact, for the
Court has never suggested even in dictum that anything more is required
by the Constitution, and it has expressly said Congress may confer standing
outside the zone of protected or regulated interests.
3 40
3. "Interested Person"
Section 509 of the FWPCA authorizes any "interested person" to
challenge certain EPA regulations and actions of the Administrator with
regard to permits. The Committee reports are silent on the meaning of
"interested person."341 Plainly enough, the intention was to avoid confer-
ring standing on everyone. But the choice of language is most unfortunate,
for it departs from all established landmarks, leaving the courts, I cannot
resist saying, at sea. "Adversely affected" would have been easily under-
stood in light of Sierra Club; the APA or its zone test could have been
plugged in if that had been thought desirable. At the very least one might
have expected either consistency with section 505 of the same statute or an
explanation of why and how the two sections differed. The attractive
conclusion that an "interested person" under section 509 is the same as one
"having an interest . . . adversely affected" under section 505 is made
more difficult by the fact that the former language was already in the bill
before the Sierra Club decision, 342 when the latter section was conspicuously
broader;3 43 thus the "interested" language of section 509 cannot be ex-
plained as a response to felt constitutional compulsion.
337. See id.
338. See Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261,264 (D.D.C. 1973) (observ-
ing that § 505 incorporates the Sierra Club test, quoting the APA, and upholding standing
because the plaintiff had alleged injury).
339. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972).
340. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151-53 (1970).
341. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1465, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 147-48 (1972).
342. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1972).
343. Id. at 363.
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Nevertheless, I would opt for the equation of the two phrases. The
most natural reading of "interested person" is one requiring that there be
something at stake; the language does not readily suggest the further APA
requirement that the litigant be within the protected or regulated zone.
Moreover, the insertion of a special standing provision suggests, although
only mildly, a dissatisfaction with leaving the question to the established test
of the APA, which would ordinarily otherwise apply. A final possibility
would be to equate "interested" with the contemporaneous House bill
provision in section 505 for groups-for example, for conservation or-
ganizations 344-- showing "a special interest" in the area affected.3 45 But the
latter provision was altered by the Conference Committee in an effort to
conform to the Sierra Club decision; it should not be presumed that the
Committee accidentally left intact another provision of the same statute
that did not so conform.
4. Section 307
Remaining for discussion is section 307 of the CAA, which provides
that "a petition for review" of specified regulations and other actions "may
be filed" but fails to say by whom. The specification in an earlier draft that
such a petition might be filed by any "interested person"3 46 was dropped
without explanation.
A number of courts have entertained section 307 challenges by conser-
vation organizations without adverting to any question of standing.3 47 The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, has clearly opined in dictum that the
omission of any standing provision reflects "a determination to let standing
in § 307 suits be controlled by the Administrative Procedure Act, '348 and
two other courts have thrown out section 307 challenges made by organiza-
tions failing to allege injury to interests protected or regulated by the
statute.
3 49
This resolution seems correct. The APA clearly applies by its own
terms, and the silence of section 307 does not suggest that any different
standing test was intended. The omission of the word "interested" is as
consistent with a desire to avoid the confusion of unfamiliar terminology as
it is with a desire to remove impediments to standing. That the test of
344. See NRDC v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which the court in an
action held to lie under the APA and not under § 509, and, without addressing the issue of
standing directly, described the plaintiffs as "corporations interested in the implementation
and enforcement of federal laws protecting the environment." Such an interest is clearly
insufficient under the APA, whatever its status under § 509. See generally Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
345. See text accompanying note 331 supra.
346. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1970).
347. E.g., a series of cases entitled NRDC v. EPA: 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974); 489 F.2d
390 (5th Cir. 1974); 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit case was reviewed in the
Supreme Court, again without mention of standing. NRDC v. Train, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
348. NRDG v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1354 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
349. See generally NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116
(10th Cir. 1973).
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section 307 is apparently more restrictive than that of the comparable
section of the FWPCA, which retains the word "interested," is a problem
for Congress rather than for the courts. Yet the First Circuit, in a highly
creative opinion, has spelled out a distinct theory in support of the conclu-
sion that anyone may file a petition under section 307.
The case was one of the many filed by the NRDC challenging state
implementation plans. Successful in part on the merits, the Council moved
for attorneys' fees. Section 307 is silent on this subject, as it is on standing.
Section 304, however, which authorizes suit by "any person" to compel
performance of a nondiscretionary duty, specifically authorizes attorneys'
fees in "any action brought pursuant to" section 304. Perceiving no reason
why Congress might have thought attorneys' fees appropriate only in
district court actions, the court held that petitions under section 307 were
actions brought under section 304. Section 307, said the court, was merely
a venue provision: "The authorization for, and conditions of, suit are
contained in § 304(a). The legislative history reveals that § 307 does no
more than direct that some proceedings must be brought in the circuit
courts."350 Not only does this argument apply with equal force to the
standing provision of section 304; the court in explicit dictum declared that
anyone could sue under section 307: "The section providing for review of
actions of the Administrator is § 304(a), and since § 304(a) specified that
standing was universal, there was no need to repeat the allowance in §
307."s351
The terminology of section 304 makes this construction seem implaus-
ible. As I have argued above, 52 an action to compel performance of a
nondiscretionary duty is a highly unusual means of expressing a general
principle of judicial review; it is the traditional language of mandamus, and
mandamus for the Administrator's inaction was the type of case discussed
in the legislative history in connection with section 304. Moreover, the
separation of sections supports this analysis; a Congress that believed it had
set out a general provision for judicial review in section 304 would be
expected to insert ancillary venue provisions at that point in the statute, not
to return to the subject three sections later, without cross-references, using
the distinct language of judicial review. The District of Columbia Circuit,
focusing largely upon the quite separate histories of sections 304 and 307,
has refused to follow the First Circuit, reluctantly holding that attorneys'
fees are unavailable under the latter: "Sections 304 and 307 contemplate
distinct groups of cases." ' Particularly telling was that court's demonstra-
tion that it is invariably impossible for a litigant to meet the requirements of
both sections: while section 307 requires review to be sought within thirty
days after the challenged action, section 304 requires sixty-day notice to the
Administrator before filing suit. Thus, the First Circuit's holding that
350. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1336 (1st Cir. 1973).
351. Id. at 1367.
352. See text accompanying notes 209-11 supra.
353. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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section 307 petitions are actions under section 304 means that nobody can
ever challenge the actions listed in section 307. It is impossible to believe
Congress had any such intention. The inconsistent standing requirements
of the two sections deserve Congress' attention, but the APA provides the
test of standing under section 307.
B. The Constitutional Question
Finally, the serious constitutional question posed by the universal
standing provision of section 304 merits discussion. Much has been written
on the constitutional status of the standing requirement, 5 4 and this is
hardly the place for a definitive resolution. The Supreme Court has never
had occasion to rule on the matter one way or the other, and its dicta
conflict. On the one hand, such a judicial conservative as Mr. Justice
Harlan once said that Congress might confer standing on anyone, 55 while
the majority in Sierra Club observed that "where a dispute is otherwise
justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue'. . is one within the power of Congress
to determine." 356 On the other hand, in 1974 the Court described the
earlier Data Processing case 357 as having "held that whatever else the 'case or
controversy' requirement embodied, its essence is a requirement of 'injury
in fact.' ,,s58 In 1975, in finding a lack of standing in a case in which
Congress had not attempted to give it, the Court declared flatly that "the
art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against
injury to the complaining party,"359 and a 1976 opinion contains no fewer
than seven explicit obiter references to a constitutional requirement of
injury.3 60
Given this inconclusive direction from above, the courts of appeals
have divided on the question of the constitutionality of unrestricted stand-
ing under the CAA. The District of Columbia Circuit, in a case arising
under section 304, has squarely upheld the citizen suit provision in reliance
on the Sierra Club dictum quoted above. 361 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
in refusing to read the unlimited standing provision of section 304 into
section 307, have argued that to do so would be unconstitutional. 362 The
Tenth Circuit opinion attempts an analysis in terms of the policies underly-
354. See, e.g., Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement? 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
355. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
356. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) (citations omitted).
357. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151-53 (1970). Since standing was upheld under a statute requiring injury, the constitutional
argument in Data Processing was pure dictum.
358. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974).
359. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
360. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38-42 (1976).
361. Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d
809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
362. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (10th Cir.
1973).
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ing the constitutional requirement of a "case" or "controversy": absent
injury, there is no assurance that "the questions will be framed with the
necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary
adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor
to assure that the . . . challenge will be made in a form thought to be
capable of judicial resolution, 3 6 3 and "unrestricted" standing endangers
the separation of powers.
The argument of "specificity" does not seem compelling in the present
context, since it appears that individual circumstances are unlikely to be
relevant to the validity of a regulation even when it is challenged by a
person who is injured. 64 But the requirement that the parties be sufficient-
ly adversary to assure adequate presentation of both sides is a significant
obstacle to citizen standing. That the plaintiff is hurt by the action he
attacks undoubtedly helps to assure that the case will be vigorously prose-
cuted. A glance at the Sierra Club case, however, suffices to show that
injury is not indispensable to provide a true adversary; no one can honestly
entertain fears of inadequate presentation when the Sierra Club sues to
protect the environment. Conversely, the trivial injury the Supreme Court
has held sufficient to satisfy standing requirements3 65 is far from absolute
assurance of vigorous advocacy; a person nominally injured may be collu-
sively in league with the defendant. Nevertheless, the undesirability of a
subjective inquiry in each case into the degree of ferocity with which the
plaintiff opposes the action he challenges argues in favor of drawing a firm
and administrable line, though it be inevitably inexact at the margin.
Moreover, even if a careful congressional provision granting standing to
those demonstrating a sufficient adverse position would be upheld, the
universal standing provision in section 304 is overbroad unless one accepts
the argument of Professor Scott: "If the plaintiff did not have the minimal
personal involvement and adverseness which Article III requires, he would
not be engaging in the costly pursuit of litigation."3 66
Adequate presentation, moreover, is not the sole consideration. Al-
though there is some appeal to Mr. Justice Harlan's position that argu-
ments based on the separation of powers are somewhat blunted when
Congress has specifically authorized citizen suits to review its own ac-
tions, 367 this cannot be a complete answer. First, it is the actions of the
Executive, not of the Congress, that the CAA subjects to citizen attack.
Moreover, no one would argue, I suppose, that Congress could give the
courts jurisdiction to decide unripe or moot cases, even if there were
363. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
364. See text accompanying notes 258-60 supra.
365. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 689 n. 14 (1973). "We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with
no more at stake. . . than a fraction of a vote,. .. a five dollar fine and costs,. .. and a $1.50
poll tax. . . '[Aln identifiable trifle is enough for standing ... ' Id. (citations omitted).
366. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645, 674
(1973).
367. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 131-32 (dissenting opinion).
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assurance that both sides would be presented by the nation's best lawyers. It
is in the interest of the courts, as well as of the Congress, that the former
not be plunged unnecessarily into making controversial pronouncements
on important legal questions. The case or controversy requirement may be
viewed as confining the courts to their traditional job of determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to something of value which he claims from
the defendant. That in exercising this function the courts inevitably are
called upon to resolve important public questions, and that their doing so is
a crucial cog in our system of checks and balances, does not mean the
courts may reach out to supervise the government by making pronounce-
ments in "cases" in which the plaintiff has nothing at stake. 368
The constitutional policy of checks and balances that underlies judicial
review,36 9 however, can be said to argue in favor of a construction of "case"
and "controversy" that would permit Congress to extend standing beyond
the injured. When harm is highly concentrated, as in automobile negli-
gence and breach of contract, the probability of a suit by the victim is
generally sufficient to assure vindication of the law. When the harm is
widespread and individually small, however, as is often true in pollution
cases, it may be that no victim will find it worth the cost to sue. There is
even the possibility in some environmental situations that no one is injured
in the Sierra Club sense, as when a deep-sea species protected by the law is
threatened with extinction. In either of these cases the injury requirement
may frustrate fulfillment of the law. 370 The inability of those within the
protected class to sue has been an explicit reason for finding standing in
others who are injured;371 whether similar considerations will be held
relevant to the definition of "case" or "controversy" remains to be seen. In
any event, traditional principles of judicial restraint should enjoin consid-
erable deference to the determination of Congress that the injury require-
ment is not a part of the "case" or "controversy" limitation.
I would venture to predict, on the basis of what I think are the
predominant as well as the most recent Supreme Court dicta, that injury
will be held to be a constitutional requirement. In policy terms this would
superficially appear to be a matter of some concern. As one court observed
in finding itself unable to award attorneys' fees under section 307, the
citizen suit is an important counterbalance to the ever present polluters
who clearly have standing: "[T]here may come a day soon when EPA's
determinations, though frequently attacked because they are too stringent,
are only seldom contested because they are not stringent enough." 372 In all
probability, however, restricting standing to the injured will not make an
important practical difference under the pollution laws. For pollution
usually hurts somebody, and, subject to the barratry laws, means can be
368. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 114-15 (1962).
369. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
370. See Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 76, 78-79, 81 (1973).
371. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254-56 (1953).
372. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
1278
HeinOnline  -- 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1278 1976-1977
ENVIRONMENTAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
found, including group representation of members and the provision of
attorneys' fees, for augmenting the resources of the victim whose stake will
not support the cost of suit. In the Ninth Circuit case, for example, while
the petition of the Natural Resources Defense Council was dismissed for
want of standing, the court reached the merits because a copetitioner, who
the court said would "suffer injury if compelled to breathe air less pure
than that mandated by the Clean Air Act," was a resident of the state whose
plan was under attack.37 3 Moreover, the informer's action noted by Profes-
sor Berger may provide a last legislative means for assuring a watchdog on
the anti-pollution side of the fence; the Supreme Court, without discussion,
has upheld a judgment in favor of a plaintiff, evidently otherwise unaf-
fected, who had been authorized to sue for fraud against the government
and to keep half the damages for himself.
3 74
C. The Remedy
Congress ought to eliminate the inconsistency by prescribing a single
test for standing under all four provisions.3 75 One goal of such a test that I
think should be obvious is to avoid the use of unfamiliar terms such as
"interest affected" or "interested party," which will provoke unnecessary
litigation. Conferring standing on everyone would meet this goal but would
probably be unconstitutional. Either the zone test or a simple injury re-
quirement, I believe, would be reasonably precise while serving the pur-
poses of the standing requirement. The Committee on Judicial Review of
the Administrative Conference proposed that the statutes provide standing
for anyone adversely affected by the action (or inaction) challenged, and I
agree.
"Adversely affected" is the language of the familiar APA. Despite the
qualification in that statute to adverse effect "within the meaning of a
relevant statute," the term "adversely affected" has acquired a recognized
meaning of its own. The Supreme Court has equated adverse effect with
"injury in fact,"37 6 which it has also said is the constitutional requirement.377
A substantial body of law has grown up to define what constitutes the
requisite injury. "Aesthetic and environmental" harm, as well as financial,
may qualify;378 it is immaterial that the injury is widely shared;37 9 the injury
373. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1974). The court might have added, but
did not, that the second branch of the APA test was also satisfied; for there can be no doubt
that a principal purpose of the statute was to protect against injuries to the public health.
374. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943). Whether such a
provision would withstand serious analysis is another question. While the monetary stake
should guarantee an adversary presentation if sufficiently substantial, I doubt that such an
artificial interest should overcome the policy against unnecessary intervention in the affairs of
other branches of the government.
375. The Administrative Conference is in accord with this position, ACUS Recommenda-
tions 1976,41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976) (Recommendation No. 76-4, F); the Conference did
not agree on what that test should be.
376. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
377. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
378. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
686 (1973).
379. Id.
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need not be substantial, as "a five dollar fine" will do; °80 but a mere
intellectual concern will not.3 8 1 Of course there will be questions of in-
terpretation. Short of abandoning all limitations on standing, the only
alternative is to prescribe a detailed code listing the categories of persons
entitled to sue. The difficulty of foreseeing all possible fact situations
makes such an approach highly risky, and I am not convinced it would
eliminate more uncertainty than it would create.
Some will object that a test of injury in fact would not permit enough
people to sue; others will contend that it would permit too many. To the
first I would respond that the Constitution leaves no choice and that
someone can almost always be found who is hurt by pollution. To the
second I would argue that it is as important to keep the EPA from being too
lax as it is to keep it from being too strict. Challenges by persons injured by
the failure to adopt strict regulations seem essential to effectuating the
statutory purpose of preventing undue pollution. To add the requirement
that the injured party be in the regulated or protected class would probably
make little practical difference, but it would add another source of litiga-
tion expense without materially advancing the policies behind the standing
requirement. I would provide standing for anyone adversely affected.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its haste to do something positive about the environment, Congress
has been quite careless in enacting provisions for judicial review under the
pollution laws. The various provisions are inconsistent, incomplete, am-
biguous, and in several respects misguided. It is time for a sober reconsid-
eration and restatement of the provisions for judicial review in light of the
accumulated experience and guided above all by the principle that jurisdic-
tional provisions should draw bright lines to minimize the waste of litiga-
tion over whether the case has been brought in the right court.
Confronted with unsatisfactory statutory provisions for judicial re-
view, the courts have understandably but improperly attempted on occa-
sion to stretch the statute in order to achieve more sensible results. In other
instances courts have shortsightedly ignored even sensible congressional
directions in an effort to do justice in a particular case. Finally, some courts
have felt required by ambiguous provisions to reach unfortunate results
that Congress has not in fact required. Pending statutory amendment, the
job of the courts is to do their best to carry out Congress' intentions,
resolving true ambiguities so as to promote an efficient and sensible system
of judicial review.
380. Id. at 689 n.14.
381. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 739-40.
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